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Investor interest in the untapped growth offered by the African continent is increasing 
dramatically. The South African Headquarter Company and the Mauritian Global Business 
Licence regimes, offer the most expansive double tax treaty networks of all African holding 
company regimes. Therefore, both of these regimes are attractive to international investors 
wanting to establish a gateway into Africa.  
Governments have identified the need to share ownership information in respect of 
corporations so as to curb base erosion and profit shifting and to prevent fiscal losses arising 
from unintended deliberate abuse of double tax treaty benefits.  
This dissertation examines whether Africa’s two favourable holding company regimes, the 
South African Headquarter Company and the Mauritian Global Business Licence, have 
characteristics and installed measures to ensure the fiscal transparency so desired by the 
international community at large. 
The examination commences with a review of features within the Mauritian and South 
African holding company regimes which perpetuate the concealment of the identities of the 
owners of these holding companies. Without measures in place to overcome these anonymity 
features, the Headquarter Company and Global Business Licence corporation regimes would 
undoubtedly undermine fiscal transparency. Therefore, this dissertation investigates the legal 
and administrative measures in place to overcome these roadblocks to fiscal transparency. 
This examination established that sufficient measures are in place to facilitate the recording 
and maintenance of ownership information for headquarter companies and global business 
licence corporations. 
Without an effective means to obtain and share accurate ownership information of 
headquarter companies and global business licence corporations, the identities of the owners 
effectively would be concealed. Given the administrative and legal elements installed by 
these jurisdictions, further examination identifies that the South African and Mauritian 
authorities employ appropriate means for gathering ownership information for these holding 
company regimes. Both South Africa and Mauritius have concluded enforceable double tax 
and tax information exchange agreements which enable the South African Revenue Service 
and the Mauritius Revenue Authority to share ownership information with foreign treaty 
partners. South Africa and Mauritius are committed to transparency standards and continue to 
expand the number of double tax agreements and tax information exchange agreements to 
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enable the effective exchange of information relating to the ownership of headquarter 
companies and global business licence corporations.   
This dissertation has identified that measures employed to date and the continued efforts of 
South Africa and Mauritius to further the sharing of ownership information will ensure the 
identification of owners of headquarter companies and global business licence corporations 
and will enable the sharing of this information with foreign tax authorities. In so doing, the 
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Abbreviations used 
CFC Controlled foreign company 
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1.1.1 Africa’s holding company offerings 
Current and anticipated increased interest in Africa by foreign investors is clear to see. In the 
decade from 2000 to 2010, the collective flow of foreign direct investment, portfolio 
investment and official development assistance is estimated to have increased from US$ 27 
billion to US$ 126 billion.1 African states are competing to secure this much needed foreign 
investment and in so doing employ various strategies. 
African states offer holding company regimes in vying for the position as the “gateway to 
Africa”. South Africa introduced its Headquarter Company offering and continues to tailor 
this offering to lure foreign corporations into using South Africa as a holding company 
jurisdiction. Mauritius has proved to be a popular jurisdiction to establish holding companies 
through its Global Business Licence offering. Botswana and the Seychelles have also joined 
their SADC partners. Botswana offers multinational corporations its International Financial 
Services Centre regime, whilst the Seychelles offers its International Business Companies 
regime to multinational corporations looking for a country to host international businesses. 
Other African states offering holding company regimes are Cape Verde and the Republic of 
Congo.2 
To entice owners of geographically-spread corporations, jurisdictions may offer a regime 
under which these internationally-based owners can house their corporations in a beneficial 
manner. The benefits offered by holding company regimes include their availability as a 
vehicle to raise finance internationally, to reduce barriers presented by exchange control, 
asset protection, ease of group reorganisations and in particular to maximise local and 
international tax advantages.3 
                                                            
1
 African Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations 
Development Programme, United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. 2011. African Economic 
Outlook 2011 at 44. Available: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/development/african-
economic-outlook-2011_aeo-2011-en [21 August 2012] 
2 Refer to Appendix A to this dissertation which sets out African states offering regimes aimed at promoting 
these countries as holding company jurisdictions. 
3 Legwaila, T. 2010. The Suitability of the South African Corporate Tax Regime for the Use of South African 
Resident Intermediary Holding Companies. University of Pretoria (Doctor of Laws) at 44 -56. 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
An investigation into whether the South African and 
Mauritian preferential holding company regimes may 




1.1.2 Tax advantages offered by preferential holding company regimes 
Various tax benefits may be offered by regimes to entice the use of that country as a holding 
company jurisdiction.  
In motivating Belgium as an effective holding company jurisdiction, Dierckx, states two-key 
tax factors offered to qualifying Belgium holding companies – an exemption from direct tax 
for dividends received; and an exemption from capital gains tax.4 Dierckx motivates Belgium 
further by identifying features which promote Belgium as a preferred jurisdiction for 
international holding companies. Tax specific features explained by Dierckx include an 
advance ruling offering allowing an element of certainty for taxpayers, accessibility to 
elimination of double tax through the use of Belgium’s extensive double tax treaty network 
and beneficial tax treatments for expatriates employed in Belgium.5 Ultimately, however, 
Dierckx notes that a preferred holding company regime would benefit investors by offering a 
complete tax-neutral outcome.6 
Olivier and Honiball summarise the following essential characteristics of an ideal 
intermediary holding company regime:7 
• Access to a favourable network of double tax treaties which reduce withholding taxes 
applied on dividends paid from investments made in other countries. 
• No or low tax imposed on dividend or other income earned by the holding company. 
• No or low withholding tax imposed on dividends paid to the owners of the holding 
company. 
• No capital gains tax payable on the sale of the holding company. 
• No CFC imputations should cause tax for the holding company in its host country. 
• No or low tax imposed on the introduction of or additions to share capital of the 
holding company. 
• The lack of exchange controls faced by the holding company and its shareholders. 
Legwaila notes that the double tax treaty network and the extent of relief offered by these 
treaties are vital in assessing the suitability of a holding company jurisdiction. The double tax 
                                                            
4 Dierckx, F. 2008. Belgium’s holding company regime – past, present and future. Bulletin for International  
Taxation. 62 (8) at 411. 
5 Dierckx (2008: 412).  
6 Dierckx (2008: 411). 
7 Olivier, L & Honiball, M. 2011. International Tax A South African Perspective 2011. Siber Ink CC at 697. 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
An investigation into whether the South African and 
Mauritian preferential holding company regimes may 




treaty networks offered by holding company jurisdictions enables the reduction or alleviation 
of tax applied to dividends paid to the holding companies.8 If withholding taxes are not set at 
a sufficiently low level, any tax efficiency gained through transferring income through a 
holding company on a tax-neutral basis will be significantly reduced. Therefore, whilst a 
number of tax advantages may be offered by holding company regimes, it is particularly 
important for a holding company jurisdiction to negotiate as wide a network as possible of 
favourable double tax agreements. 
1.1.3 South African Headquarter Company and Mauritian Global Business Licence 
regimes as preferred African holding company regimes 
1.1.3.1 Double tax treaty network 
South Africa’s Headquarter Company regime and the Mauritian Global Business Licence 
regime are the only African holding company regimes which offer a significant treaty 
network allowing for reduced withholding tax rates. South Africa has 77 double tax 
agreements,9 whilst Mauritius has concluded 46 such agreements.10 This is in comparison to 
Botswana, Cape Verde, the Republic of Congo and the Seychelles concluding 11, 2, 4 and 26 
agreements respectively.11 Furthermore, South Africa and Mauritius have concluded 24 and 
19 agreements respectively with sister African nations. 
The tax agreement networks of South Africa and Mauritius allow the Headquarter Company 
and Global Business Licence Regimes to provide the best possible bases in Africa from 
which profits can be remitted with the least imposition of withholding taxes. Other 
preferential tax treatments offered to entities registered and licensed as headquarter 
companies and global business licence corporations are discussed further. 
1.1.3.2 Other Preferential tax implications offered for a Headquarter Company 
1.1.3.2.1 Relief on the repatriation of profits in the form of dividends  
Dividends declared by South African tax resident companies will constitute a "dividend" in 
the hands of the recipient or shareholder.12  
                                                            
8 Legwaila, T. 2012. Tax characteristics of an ideal holding company location. De Jure. Available: 
http://www.dejure.up.ac.za/images/files/vol45-1-2012/Chapter%202.pdf [27 November 2013] 
9  Refer to Appendix B to this dissertation for further details. 
10 Refer to Appendix C to this dissertation for further details. 
11 Refer to Appendix D-G to this dissertation for further details. 
12 Income Tax Act, No 58 of 1962. 1962. Pretoria: Government Printer ("the Income Tax Act"). 
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A headquarter company must be resident in South Africa and therefore distributions received 
by shareholders from such headquarter companies should be exempt from South African 
income tax.13 
Furthermore, dividends withholding tax is not applied on dividends declared by a headquarter 
company.14 
The South African Headquarter Company regime therefore offers shareholders a tax-free 
distribution of the profits of these companies. 
1.1.3.2.2 Relief from CFC imputation for foreign subsidiaries 
South African tax legislation imputes the taxable income of foreign subsidiaries to South 
African resident shareholders, if these foreign subsidiaries constitute a CFC. A foreign 
subsidiary would constitute a CFC if any South African tax resident shareholder directly or 
indirectly holds more than 50% of the total participation rights or voting rights in such 
foreign subsidiary. However, a South African resident shareholder, which is a headquarter 
company, is excluded when determining whether more than 50% of the participation rights or 
voting rights in a foreign subsidiary are controlled by South African residents.15 
The net income of foreign subsidiaries of headquarter companies is therefore not subjected to 
South African income tax in terms of CFC imputation. 
1.1.3.2.3 Relief from transfer pricing adjustments arising from financial assistance 
Inward financial assistance received by headquarter companies from foreign companies 
which hold at least 10% of the equity shares and voting rights in that headquarter company 
may not be subjected to transfer pricing adjustments.16 
Furthermore, outward financial assistance granted by headquarter companies to foreign 
companies in which the headquarter company holds at least 10% of the equity shares and 
voting rights is not subjected to transfer pricing adjustments.17 
Headquarter companies are therefore free to receive and grant financial assistance on terms 
which aid the movement of that assistance without imposing additional South African income 
tax cash outflows. 
                                                            
13 Subsec 10(1)(k) of the Income Tax Act. 
14 Subsec 64E(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
15 Subsec 9D(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
16 Subsec 31(5)(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
17 Subsec 31(5)(b) of Income Tax Act.  
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1.1.3.2.4 Relief from capital gains tax 
Headquarter companies are free from capital gains tax which otherwise would be imposed on 
the disposal of equity interests in foreign companies.18 
Further relief from capital gains tax is available for non-resident shareholders of headquarter 
companies. Capital gains tax on the disposal of shares in South African resident companies is 
only imposed on non-resident shareholders if those shares constitute an interest in immovable 
property situated in South Africa.19 An interest in immovable property would only exist 
where 80% or more of the market value of the shares in the headquarter company is 
attributable to immovable property situated in South Africa.20  In terms of the qualifying 
criteria, headquarter companies, must invest more than 80% (measured on a cost basis) in 
assets attributable to foreign investments.21 Therefore it is unlikely that the disposal by a 
foreign shareholder of an investment in a headquarter company will attract South African 
capital gains tax.  
The headquarter company regime therefore offers foreign persons a shield from the South 
African capital gains tax arising from the disposal of foreign investments and from the 
disposal of shares held in a headquarter company. 
1.1.3.3 Preferential tax implications offered under the Global Business Licence regime 
1.1.3.3.1 Low income tax rate on local income 
Mauritius is a low tax regime taxing residents on a world-wide basis and non-residents on 
Mauritian sourced income at a rate of 15%.  
Under the Global Business Licence regime, depending on the licence granted, an entity can 
enjoy further preferential income tax concessions on foreign sourced income.  
1.1.3.3.2 Foreign tax credits on foreign income 
Income from foreign sources derived by a corporation issued with a GBL1 automatically 
entitles the entity to a foreign tax credit of 80% of the Mauritian tax rate. This effectively 
imposes a maximum tax rate of 3%.22 The resulting foreign tax credit of 12% would be 
                                                            
18 Paragraph 64B(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
19 Paragraph 2(1)(b)(i) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
20 Paragraph 2(2) of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
21 Refer to chapter 2.2.3. 
22 Income Tax Act, No. 16 of 1995. Regulation. 1996. Government Gazette. Government Notice 80 of 1996. 
Port Louis: Government Printing Department. (Mauritius). 
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utilised even if the income has been subject to foreign tax of less than 12%.  The use of 
GBL1 corporations to hold investments in low or no tax jurisdictions therefore creates a tax 
efficient holding structure for international investments.23 
The foreign tax credit regime therefore offers GBL 1 entities relief from Mauritian taxes 
imposed on foreign income. Effectively, this relief ensures that the maximum Mauritian 
income tax rate payable on foreign sourced income is 3%.  
In the case of a Mauritian tax resident GBL2 entity, foreign sourced income will receive 
unilateral relief from foreign taxes on that income. The relief is in relation to the foreign taxes 
suffered and for which the GBL2 corporations can provide written proof.24 
1.1.3.3.3 Availability of double tax agreements 
Mauritian tax resident entities, which are GBL1 corporations, can utilise double tax 
agreements concluded by Mauritius to lower income tax exposure on income derived from 
foreign states. Such a dispensation is not available to GBL2 corporations.25 
1.1.3.3.4 Relief from taxes on dividends and interest paid 
No withholding taxes are imposed on the payment of dividends to persons not resident of 
Mauritius. Furthermore, dividends paid between entities issued with Global Business 
Licences are exempt from Mauritian tax.26 
If a non-resident does not conduct business in Mauritius and earns interest from a GBL1 
corporation, no Mauritian withholding tax will be imposed.27 
In the case of a GBL1 entity, it is therefore possible for investment income to pass through 
this entity to a non-resident free of tax. 
1.1.3.3.5 No capital gains tax 
Mauritius does not impose capital gains tax and therefore disposals made by Mauritian tax 
resident entities will not attract this tax.  
                                                            
23 Koeleman, M.F. 2012. A critical review of the South African Headquarter Company regime in light of its 
stated objective of attracting foreign investment. Cape Town, South Africa. University of Cape Town. (Master 
of Commerce) at 65 – 66. 
24 Income Tax Act, No. 16 of 1995. 1995. Port Louis: Government Printing Department. (Mauritius) – “the 
Mauritian Income Tax Act”. Refer to Subsec 77(1). 
25 S 73A of the Mauritian Income Tax Act. 
26 S 7 and S 111B, read with subpart B of Part II to the Second Schedule to the Mauritian Income Tax Act. 
27 Ibid. 
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1.1.4 Headquarter companies and global business licence corporations as premiere 
Africa holding company regimes 
It is submitted that the tax relief offered by these regimes together with access to established 
double tax agreement networks places the South African Headquarter Company and 
Mauritian Global Business Licence regimes as the front runners for favourable holding 
company regimes within Africa. 
1.1.5 The international community’s drive to improve tax transparency to counter tax 
avoidance and tax evasion 
1.1.5.1 Addressing base erosion and profit shifting 
There is a strong perception that Governments are losing vital tax revenues as a result of 
corporations funnelling taxable profits from higher tax jurisdictions to more friendly tax 
jurisdictions.28 This perception has led to the inclusion of the issue of base erosion and profit 
shifting on the agenda of the G20 29 meetings. 
The opportunity to use corporate structures to accomplish base erosion has been specifically 
identified.30 The fight against base erosion requires constant efforts in improving 
transparency in tax matters. Without tax transparency, international cooperation would be 
ineffective and would therefore thwart any understanding of the workings of international 
corporation structures.31 
1.1.5.2 Restricting the entitlement to treaty benefits 
As part of the 1998 OECD Report on Harmful Tax Competition, harm caused by the abuse of 
treaty benefits by unintended persons was highlighted.32 The establishment of conduit 
companies in countries with preferential double tax agreements in order to exploit treaty 
benefits was specifically identified as a harmful tax practice. Recommendation nine of this 
                                                            
28 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2013. Addressing Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting. OECD Publishing. 
29 The G20 comprises 19 developed and emerging economies and the European Union. The G20’s role is to 
coordinate policy-making at an international level.  
30 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2013:44). 
31 Ibid at 83. 
32 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2012. R(17). Restricting the entitlement to treaty 
benefits, in Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2010: Full Version at R(17) – 2. Available: 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/model-tax-convention-on-income-and-on-capital-2010/r-17-restricting-
the-entitlement-to-treaty-benefits_9789264175181-110-en [21 August 2012] 
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report suggested that states amend their double tax agreements in order to prevent residents of 
third-party states, that are considered tax havens or which have harmful preferential tax 
regimes, from abusing these agreements.33 
To counter this abuse of conduit companies it is recommended that only the beneficial owner 
of the said income may potentially be able to claim treaty benefits. However, a pitfall in this 
approach is that the absence of reliable information to determine the identity of the beneficial 
owner, will lead to the continual abuse without detection and corrective action.34 In this 
regard treaty partners are harmed by unintended use of double tax agreements, where the 
beneficial owner cannot be identified due to a lack of transparency. 
1.1.5.3 Fiscal transparency– relevance to holding company regimes 
The international community is promoting and advocating improved fiscal transparency 
measures aimed at countering tax avoidance and tax evasion. Appropriate fiscal transparency 
measures must be implemented by holding company regimes to prevent these vehicles from 
being abused to perpetuate tax avoidance and evasion through the concealment of the 
beneficial owners of these holding companies. 
1.2 Research question 
With the anticipated growth in economic activity on the African continent and with the 
African holding company offerings available to be used not only as a springboard into Africa 
but also undoubtedly as a springboard internationally, interest in these offerings is bound to 
intensify. 
The question is whether Africa’s two favourable holding company regimes, the South 
African Headquarter Company and the Mauritian Global Business Licence, have 
characteristics and installed measures to ensure the fiscal transparency so desired by the 
international community at large? 
1.3 Scope limitations of this dissertation 
This dissertation does not seek to investigate the measures taken by other African preferential 
holding company regimes, such as those offered by the Seychelles and Botswana. In view of  
                                                            
33 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1998. Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging 
Global Issue. Available: http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/44430243.pdf [9 October 2012] at 47.  
34 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012: R(17) 23-24). 
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the author’s perceived preference of the South African and Mauritian holding company 
jurisdictions within Africa, the scope of this dissertation focuses solely on these jurisdictions. 
In view of the author, as the perceived desirability of the other African holding company 
jurisdictions increases, it will also intensify the necessity to place the fiscal transparency of 
these regimes under the microscope. 
1.4 Limitations of this dissertation 
The official Code Civil Mauricien and the Code de Commerce of Mauritius is written in 
French. As such these Codes have not been reviewed. The relevant provisions of these Codes 
have been identified and interpreted from literature reviewed during the preparation of this 
dissertation.  
1.5 Research method 
The research method employed in this dissertation is of a legal nature. A review is undertaken 
of the laws, regulations and codes employed by the South African and Mauritian  
jurisdictions. Literature prepared following the OECD Global Forum peer reviews of South 
Africa and Mauritius and court decisions are reviewed to substantiate the practical application 
and enforcement of these laws, regulations and codes. Literature prepared by the OECD and 
other authors is also reviewed to provide a basis for assessing the requirements and 
characteristics to aid the successful implementation of fiscally transparent regimes.  
1.6 Structure of the dissertation 
Chapters 2 and 3, respectively, of this dissertation investigate whether appropriate measures 
have been enforced to promote the South African Headquarter Company and Mauritian 
Global Business Licence regimes as fiscally transparent regimes. Both chapters are structured 
in the same format. 
Subchapter 2 of these chapters describes the qualifying criteria for these regimes and 
identifies qualifying persons.  
Subchapter 3 seeks to identify inherent factors posed by these qualifying persons and criteria 
which may inherently prevent the identification of the beneficial owners of these entities. 
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Requirements to record and maintain information essential in identifying the beneficial owner 
of these entities are detailed in subchapter 4. This subchapter also details the provisions 
aimed at enforcing these recording requirements.  
The review conducted in subchapter 4 highlights the means required for the authorities to 
ensure the collection and maintenance of information relating to beneficial ownership of 
entities. In this subchapter, the appropriateness of these means is evaluated in light of the 
circumstances facing the relevant states. 
Subchapter 5 reviews the basis for sharing the beneficial ownership information in light of 
international transparency standards to form a view as whether this information once 
collected can be effectively shared with foreign authorities requiring this information. 
Chapter 4 concludes with the findings from chapters 2 and 3 to present an answer to the 
research question posed. 
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2. South Africa as a fiscally transparent holding company regime 
2.1 South Africa's Headquarter Company regime 
The South African National Treasury introduced its holding company offering, in the form of 
headquarter companies, for years of assessment commencing on or after 1 January 2011.35 
2.2 Criteria for qualifying as a headquarter company 
An election to be treated as a headquarter company under South African tax legislation is 
available. The qualifying criteria which must be met in order to elect such treatment are 
discussed briefly. 
2.2.1 South African tax resident company 
The first element which must be met before a company may be classified as a headquarter 
company is that the company must be resident for tax purposes.36 
2.2.1.1 What constitutes a company? 
A company can include both foreign and locally incorporated associations, corporations and 
companies. Locally incorporated and registered close corporations also constitute a 
company.37 
Interestingly, the definition extends to foreign portfolios which are comparable to collective 
investment schemes in bonds and securities. However, these foreign collective investment 
schemes would only constitute a company for South African income tax purposes if 
participation in the scheme is offered to the general public.38 
A co-operative registered in terms of the Co-operatives Act No.91 of 1981 or Act No.14 of 
2005 would also be a company in terms of South African tax legislation.39 
A "foreign partnership" would not constitute a company.  A foreign association of persons 
which is transparent in determining the income tax liability in a foreign jurisdiction, thereby 
                                                            
35 Taxation Laws Amendments Act, No. 24 of 2011. 2012. Government Gazette. 599. 10 January. Government 
notice   no. 34927. Pretoria: Government Printer. 
36 Subsec 9I(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
37 S 1 of the Income Tax Act. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid.  
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imposing the foreign tax liability on each member or partner would constitute a "foreign 
partnership" and not a "company".40 
A trust and a company are distinguished for tax purposes as each term has its separate 
definition in the Income Tax Act.41 
Foreign trusts and foreign foundations are not specifically considered in the Income Tax Act 
and the concepts of a foundation and a trust may vary in foreign jurisdictions. 
Ordinarily a trust is a vehicle employed in common law jurisdictions through which the legal 
ownership of assets is settled with a legal person who controls the assets for the benefit of 
ascertained beneficiaries.42 
A foundation is the closest civil law equivalent to the common law trust. Assets would 
ordinarily be transferred to a foundation which is a separate legal entity formed for a defined 
purpose. The assets of the foundation would be applied towards that purpose under the 
management of a board of directors. Ordinarily, foundations would not have any shareholders 
or owners.43 The goal of a foundation is to administer assets under the control of directors 
appointed in a fiduciary capacity for an ascertained purpose.  
It is submitted that the definition of trust in the Income Tax Act serves as a means to 
differentiate a foreign trust or foundation from a "company". This definition reads widely as 
follows: 
"means any trust fund consisting of cash or other assets which are administered and 
controlled by a person acting in a fiduciary capacity, where such person is appointed 
under the deed of trust or by agreement or under the will of a deceased person".44 
Given the concept of "trust" in the Income Tax Act it would be difficult for a foreign trust or 
a foreign foundation not to be treated as a "trust", should the assets of the trust or foundation 
be controlled by a person for the benefit of others.45 
                                                            
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2001. Behind the Corporate Veil: Using 
Corporate Entities for Illicit Purposes at 25. Available:http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/content/book/9789264195608-en [21 August 2012] 
43 Ibid at 27. 
44 S 1 of the Income Tax Act. 
45 Olivier, L & Honiball, M (2011:135). 
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Therefore, both foreign established trusts and foundations should be treated as a trust for 
South African tax purposes unless the foundation or trust is specifically classified as a 
"company".46 
It would be possible for a foreign trust or foundation to constitute a "company" where the 
trust or foundation is seen to be a body corporate formed or established under the laws of a 
foreign country.47 A number of countries have introduced laws, under which these foreign 
trusts and foundations are separately formed or established.48 For instance, Mauritius has 
recently implemented legislation which permits the registration and separate legal status of 
foundations established in Mauritius.49 
In  conclusion, it is submitted that a natural person, a foreign partnership and a local trust will 
not be treated as a company for South African income tax purposes and therefore would not 
qualify as a headquarter company. 
2.2.1.2 Classifying a company as South African tax resident 
A company would be South African tax resident should it meet the definition of "resident". 
The definition of "resident" relevant to a company reads as follows: 
"is incorporated, established or formed in the Republic or which has its place of 
effective management in the Republic...." 50 
However, the proviso to the definition of "resident" is relevant in classifying a company as 
South African tax resident. This proviso reads: 
"...but does not include any person who is deemed to be exclusively a resident of 
another country for purposes of the application of any agreement entered into 
between the governments of the Republic and that other country for the avoidance of 
double taxation.” 51 
A company incorporated in South Africa will be South African tax resident, unless a double 
tax agreement with a foreign country deems the company to be tax resident in that foreign 
country. A company may be incorporated in a foreign country but may still be South African 
                                                            
46 Ibid. 
47 S 1 of the Income Tax Act. 
48 Olivier, L & Honiball, M (2011:135). 
49 The Foundations Act, No. 8 of 2012. 2012. Port Louis: Government Printing Department. (Mauritius).  ("the 
Foundations Act"). 
50 S 1 of the Income Tax Act. 
51 Ibid. 
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tax resident should the company be effectively managed in South Africa and not deemed to 
be a resident of that foreign country in terms of a double tax agreement. 
2.2.2 Shareholder composition 
During the year of assessment in which the company elects to be treated as a headquarter 
company, each shareholder and, if applicable, other companies forming part of the same 
group of companies must hold at least 10% of the equity shares and voting rights in that 
headquarter company.52 
2.2.3 Foreign asset holding 
At least 80% of the cost of the total assets of the company (excluding any cash or bank 
deposits payable on demand) must be attributed to: 
• any interest in equity shares in; 
• any amount loaned or advanced to; or 
• any intellectual property that is licensed by that company to, 
any foreign company in which the headquarter company (whether alone or together with any 
other company forming part of the same group of companies as such company) holds at least 
10% of the equity shares and voting rights.53 
The investment by the headquarter company in these asset classes must be met at the end of 
the year of assessment in which the election is made and at the end of all previous years of 
assessment.54 
2.2.4 Income requirements 
Lastly, should the gross income of the headquarter company exceed R 5 million, at least 50% 
of that company's gross income must be attributed to any combination of: 
• any rental, dividend, interest, royalty or service fee paid or payable by any foreign 
company (in which the potential headquarter company holds more than 10% of the equity 
shares and voting rights as discussed in the second requirement); 
                                                            
52 Subsec 9I(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act. 
53 Subsec 9I(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act. 
54 Ibid. 
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• any proceeds from the disposal of an interest in equity shares in a foreign company (in 
which the potential headquarter company holds more than 10% of the equity shares and 
voting rights as discussed in the second requirement); or 
• any proceeds from the disposal of intellectual property licensed by that company to any 
foreign company (in which the potential headquarter company holds more than 10% of 
the equity shares and voting rights as discussed in the second requirement).55 
This income requirement is to be satisfied by the end of the year of assessment in which the 
election application is made.56 
2.3 Factors presented by headquarter companies which may roadblock the 
identification and exchange of ownership information 
The South African Headquarter Company regime contains factors which may inherently pose 
a threat to obtaining and sharing information on the beneficial owners of these companies. 
Inherent factors which are relevant to the South African Headquarter Company regime are 
discussed further. 
2.3.1 Corporate form of a headquarter company 
The first qualifying criteria for a headquarter company is that the entity constitutes a 
company under the Income Tax Act. 
2.3.1.1 Private companies 
Private limited liability companies are specifically identified as a vehicle to aid anonymity, as 
these companies ordinarily face less regulation.57 
Headquarter companies may take the form of private limited liability companies under the 
Companies Act.58 
Headquarter companies therefore inherently may offer a cloak of anonymity unless sufficient 
supervision and regulation exists over identifying and maintaining records regarding the 
ownership and control of these companies. 
                                                            
55 Subsec 9I(2)(c) of the Income Tax Act. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001:23). 
58 Companies Act, No 71 of 2008. 2008. Pretoria: Government Printer ("the Companies Act") - refer to subsec 8.  
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2.3.1.2 Close corporations 
Close corporations, much like private limited liability companies, face less regulation and 
therefore offer a means to hide the identity of beneficial owners unless sufficient supervision 
and regulation exists over identifying and maintaining records regarding the ownership and 
control of these entities. 
2.3.1.3 Foreign collective investment schemes 
Foreign collective investment schemes in participation bonds and equities, the membership of 
which is offered to the general public, would constitute a company for the purposes of the 
Headquarter Companies regime. However, given the public membership of these collective 
investment schemes, regulatory supervision over these vehicles is likely to prevent them from 
being misused to shelter the identity of the beneficial owners and persons in control of these 
vehicles. 
2.3.1.4 Co-operatives 
Co-operatives may only be established under the Co-operative Act No.14 of 2005. The use of  
the words  "co-operative" or "co-op" may not be used in a business name whilst the business 
is not registered as a co-operative and this will constitute a punishable offence.59 
Co-operatives must have a minimum of five persons or two other co-operatives as 
members.60 
The number of co-operatives has escalated significantly in recent years, although few are 
active internationally. That could change in coming years as their popularity grows.61 
The potential for co-operatives to engage in an international environment and the relatively 
low number of required members, may allow this vehicle to be used in hiding details of 
beneficial owners. That is, unless sufficient supervision and regulation exists over identifying 
and maintaining records regarding the ownership and control of these companies. 
                                                            
59 Co-operative Act, No. 14 of 2005. 2005. Pretoria: Government Printer ("the Co-operative Act") - refer to s 12. 
60 S 6 of the Co-operative Act. 
61 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2012. Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes Peer Reviews: South Africa: Combined Phase 1+ Phase 2 at 34. 
Available: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org.ezproxy.uct.ac.za/taxation/global-forum-on-transparency-and-
exchange-of-information-for-tax-purposes-peer-reviews-south-africa-2012_9789264182134-en [20 January 
2014] 
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2.3.2 Foreign incorporated companies 
As previously noted, companies incorporated in foreign countries may be tax resident in 
South Africa and therefore may qualify to be a headquarter company.  
The inherent implication of foreign incorporated companies being tax resident in South 
Africa is that their ownership information may not be available to South African authorities. 
Furthermore, where such ownership information is not immediately available, the question 
arises as to whether South Africa has either the means to gather such information or to 
request it from the relevant foreign authorities. 
In the absence of such accurate ownership information or the ability to gather it either 
through persons subject to South Africa's jurisdiction or through foreign authorities who hold 
such information, foreign incorporated companies may use the Headquarter Company regime 
to conceal the identity of the beneficial owners of these companies. 
2.3.3 Foreign foundations and foreign trusts 
In a number of jurisdictions it is possible to create vehicles which assist in hiding the identity 
of the beneficial owners of the foundation or trust. For instance, blind trusts may be used to 
facilitate tax evasion through the non-disclosure of the beneficiaries in the trust deed.62 
Given the potential for these vehicles to be registered as a headquarter company, the South 
African Headquarter Companies regime may be utilised in the form a foreign foundation or 
trust, to hide the identity of the beneficial owner of the foundation or trust.   
2.3.4 Issuing of bearer shares 
2.3.4.1 Availability of bearer shares  
Under the Companies Act, a person obtains the rights inherent in the shares of the company, 
should that person's name be entered into the company's securities register.63 The predecessor 
to the 2008 Companies Act contained a similar provision.64 As such South African corporate 
law did not permit the use of bearer shares. 
                                                            
62 Olivier, L & Honiball, M (2011:132). 
63 Subsec 37(9) of the Companies Act. 
64 Companies Act, No. 61 of 1973. 1973. Pretoria: Government Printer ("Companies Act 1973") - refer to subsec 
103(2). 
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2.3.4.2 Share warrants issued under the Companies Act of 1973 
The Companies Act of 1973 permitted the issuing of share warrants by public companies.65 
The share warrants would be issued for fully paid up shares and entitled the bearer of the 
warrant to the underlying shares and future dividends attributed to those shares. The 
Companies Act of 1973 required the following details to be kept regarding share warrants:66 
• The fact that the warrant is issued. 
• A statement of the shares included in the warrant. 
• The date that the warrant was issued. 
Companies that had previously issued share warrants, which are still in issue, were required 
to disclose this fact in an SWB001 return to SARS by 31 July 2013.67 
In terms of the Companies Act of 1973, only public companies could have issued share 
warrants.68 As of 1 May 2011, the last date on which it was possible to issue share warrants 
under this Companies Act, approximately 3000 public companies were registered. This only 
represented 0.24% of all companies registered in South Africa at the time.69 
Importantly, Section 15 of the Exchange Control Regulations70 specifically prohibits the 
acquisition, disposal or any other dealing in any bearer security and prohibits the payment of 
a dividend in respect of any bearer security.71 This regulation suggests that in practice, it has 
not been possible to issue share warrants. Furthermore, relevant South African authorities 
have no record of share warrants having been issued.  The Director Issuer Regulation at the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange has also confirmed that the stock exchange does not permit the 
issue or listing of share warrants to bearer shares and that such share warrants had never been 
encountered in practice.72 
                                                            
65 Subsec 101 of the Companies Act 1973. 
66 Subsec 105(3) of the Companies Act 1973. 
67 Tax Administration Act. Regulation.2013. Government Gazette. 14 June. Government notice No. 36565. 
Pretoria: Government Printer.  
68 Subsec 101 of the Companies Act 1973. 
69 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:16). 
70 Exchange Control Regulations. 1961. Government Gazette. 1 December. Government notice No. R.1111 
Pretoria: Government Printer.  
71 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012: 25).  
72 Ibid at 26. 
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2.3.4.3 Bearer shares and share warrants used as a device to conceal the identities of 
beneficial owners 
Under previously and currently enacted South African company law, no valid bearer share 
may be issued. 
If share warrants are in issue, SARS was required to be notified of this by 31 July 2013. 
Due to the low proportion of companies that could have issued bearer shares and due to the 
legislated prohibition to deal in such instruments, the likelihood is very low that, in practice, 
share warrants may have been used as a device to conceal the identities of the beneficial 
owners of the warrants.73 
In conclusion bearer shares and bearer-like instruments are unlikely to pose a significant 
threat to the identification of owners of headquarter companies.74 
2.3.5 Registration of nominee shareholders 
Nominee shareholders may be registered in terms of the Companies Act.75 Furthermore, no 
legislated prohibition exists for service providers acting as nominee shareholders.76 
The possibility of concealing the identity of the beneficial owner of headquarter companies is 
increased as a result of the potential abuse of nominee shareholders. Measures may or may 
not be in place to identify the beneficial owner who has authorised the use of nominee 
shareholders.  
2.3.6 Conclusion - identification of inherent factors presented by headquarter 
companies which may roadblock transparency standards 
The South African Headquarter Companies regime presents certain inherent factors or loop 
holes to circumvent the effective exchange of information with respect to identifying the 
owners of these companies. 
The following inherent undermining factors have been identified: 
• Headquarter companies may take the form of a private limited liability company or a 
close corporation. 
                                                            
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Subsec 56(1) of the Companies Act. 
76 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:24).  
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• Headquarter companies may take the form of a co-operative. 
• Headquarter companies may be a foreign incorporated and registered company. 
• Headquarter companies may be a foreign established foundation or trust. 
• Headquarter companies may issue shares to nominee shareholders. 
Measures taken by the South African Legislature and authorities are investigated in order to 
identify whether they are likely to overcome the roadblock presented by these factors.  
2.4 Measures undertaken by the South African Legislature and South African 
authorities to remove impediments to identifying owners of headquarter 
companies 
 South African authorities, such as SARS and the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission,77 can take administrative measures to ensure the availability of details regarding 
owners of headquarter companies.  
The South African Legislature is responsible for providing a legal basis for the South African 
authorities to gather such ownership information.  
Measures undertaken by the South African Legislature and South African authorities to 
diminish the effectiveness of roadblocks to obtaining information relating to the ownership of 
headquarter companies are discussed below. 
The effectiveness of these measures is dependent on the implementation and enforcement of 
appropriate methods to enable transparency. 
2.4.1 Obtaining and maintaining information regarding private limited liability 
companies and close corporations 
Private limited liability companies and close corporations ordinarily face less regulation and 
supervision by authorities and therefore may be more readily used to conceal the identity of 
beneficial owners. Measures undertaken to obtain and maintain ownership information of 
headquarter companies is considered further. 
                                                            
77 The Companies and Intellectual Property Commission is mandated by the Companies Act to administer and 
govern the Companies Act. 
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2.4.1.1 Measures to accurately record ownership information of private limited liability 
companies and close corporations 
All companies incorporated in South Africa are required to maintain a register of issued 
shares. The information required to be entered into the share register is as follows: 
• "the names and addresses of persons to whom securities have been issued".78 
• "the number of securities issued to each of them” [shareholders].79 
In order to obtain a certificate of incorporation, all close corporations are required to file with 
the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (or its predecessor) information 
regarding the founding members.80 This includes: 
• The full name of each member and his or her identity number or if the member does 
not have an identity number the date of birth of the member.81 
• The residential address of each member.82 
2.4.1.2 Measures to maintain ownership information of private limited liability companies 
and close corporations 
All companies in South Africa are required to maintain a register of issued shares. The 
information required to be entered into the share register is as follows: 
• The name and address of the person to whom a share is transferred.83 
• The description of the shares transferred.84 
• The date that the shares were transferred.85 
Upfront reporting to the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission is not required for 
changes in shareholding.86 
Where the membership of a close corporation is altered, the amended founding statement 
(including updated membership information) must be lodged with the Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission within 28 days of the change in membership.87 
                                                            
78 Subsec 50(2)(b)(i) of the Companies Act. 
79 Subsec 50(2)(b)(ii) of the Companies Act. 
80 Close Corporations Act, No. 69 of 1984. 1984. Pretoria: Government Printer ("Close Corporations Act") - 
refer to s 13 – 14. 
81 Subsec 12(d) of the Close Corporations Act.  
82 Ibid. 
83 Subsec 51(5)(a) of the Companies Act. 
84 Subsec 51(5)(b) of the Companies Act. 
85 Subsec 51(5)(c) of the Companies Act. 
86 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:19). 
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Companies (including close corporations) resident in South Africa are obliged to register for 
income tax and to complete income tax returns annually. For unlisted (private) companies, 
SARS must be notified of changes in shareholdings. This notification is present in the form of 
a question to that effect at the end of the annual income tax return.88 Changes in 
shareholdings must be detailed annually in a schedule supporting the income tax return in 
order for the taxpayer to comply with reporting obligations.  Therefore, SARS is provided 
with information which should allow its systems to identify whether more details are required 
from a company with regard to changes in shareholdings.89 
The Legislature has provided for upfront disclosure of the ownership for headquarter 
companies. The Finance Minister may specify reporting requirements for companies electing 
to be treated as a headquarter company.90 Therefore companies electing to be treated as a 
headquarter company are required to submit an RCH01 form.91 In terms of this RCH01 
schedule, the legal name, the address, the country of residence and percentage shareholding 
for each registered shareholder of the headquarter company must be disclosed to SARS.   
2.4.1.3 Enforcement of requirements to record and maintain ownership information 
Maintenance of share registers and membership information is encouraged through a 
combination of threatened punitive actions and legislated restrictions on the rights enjoyed by 
shareholders. 
Failure to keep a share register can result in fines or imprisonment. Any failure to comply 
with a notice by the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission may be referred to the 
courts for the imposition of an administrative penalty or referred for prosecution.92 The 
administrative penalty for failing to comply with a notice may not exceed the greater of 10% 
of the company's turnover or R 1 million.93 In instances where prosecution is instituted, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
87 Subsec 15(1) of the Close Corporations Act. 
88 For instance, a carry forward of assessed losses may be disallowed when income is derived by a taxpayer as a 
result of a change in shareholding - see subsec 103(2) of the Income Tax Act. 
89 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:20). 
90 Subsec 9I(4) of the Income Tax Act. 
91 SARS. 2012. RCH01 Schedule for Companies Electing to be a Headquarter Company. Available: 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/SARSForms/RCH01%20-
%20Schedule%20for%20Companies%20Electing%20to%20be%20a%20Headquarter%20Company%20-
%20External%20Form.pdf [15November 2013] 
92 Subsec 171(7) of the Companies Act. 
93 Subsec 175(1) read with Subsec 175(5) of the Companies Act. 
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responsible officer (such as a director) may be subjected to a fine up to R 20 000 94 and may 
face imprisonment not exceeding 12 months.95 
The fines and penalties faced by close corporations is identical to those for companies.96 
Shareholders are generally not permitted to exercise their rights in terms of a shareholding in 
a company, such as a right to receive a declared dividend, unless that person's name is 
entered into the company's share register.97 
There is no legislation enabling the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission to 
require non listed companies to provide information automatically relating to shareholding.98 
On registering a company for income tax, no obligation exists to provide ownership 
information to SARS.99 However the details of shareholders’ of headquarter companies must 
be disclosed to SARS annually.100  
Penalties may be levied under tax legislation for persons failing to comply with the 
administrative provisions of the Act.101 A fixed amount administrative penalty may be 
imposed should a taxpayer fail to comply with an obligation under a taxing act and such non-
compliance is identified by way of notice by the Commissioner for SARS.102 However to 
date, the Commissioner has identified only the failure of natural persons to file an income tax 
return as the default which is subject to this penalty.103  
The failure to notify SARS of a change in ownership as part of the annual tax return, 
including the details rendered in an RCH01 return, may render the public officer of the 
company guilty of an offence, if the omission is seen to be intentional or without just 
cause.104 If convicted the public officer would face a fine or imprisonment not exceeding two 
years.105 
                                                            
94 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:35). 
95 Subsec 214(3) read with 216(b) of the Companies Act.  
96 S 82 of the Close Corporations Act. 
97 Subsec 37(9)(a) of the Companies Act. 
98 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:19). 
99 Ibid. 
100 Refer to chapter 2.4.1.2. 
101 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012: 35).  
102Tax Administration Act, No.28 of 2011. 2011. Pretoria: Government Printer ("the Tax Administration Act") - 
refer to s 210 read with s 211. 
103 Tax Administration Act. Regulation.2012. Government Gazette. 1 October. Government notice No. 35733. 
Pretoria: Government Printer.  
104 Subsec 234(j) read with subsec 246(5) of the Tax Administration Act. 
105 Subsec 234 of the Tax Administration Act. 
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There is evidence that South African authorities do impose convictions on intentional 
defaults. For the period 1 April 2011 until February 2012, over 230 taxpayers were 
prosecuted for various tax-related offences. These convictions resulted in imprisonment 
totalling 370 years and fines totalling nearly R 5 million.106 
2.4.1.4 Conclusion 
Measures appear to exist which encourage the accurate recording and updating of ownership 
information of companies and close corporations. Specific details regarding changes in 
ownership are not required to be supplied automatically to the authorities in the case of 
companies. However, the legal owners of headquarter companies are disclosed to SARS 
annually in terms of an RCH01 schedule.  
It is submitted that South Africa is largely reliant on upfront disclosure and investigative 
means for acquiring and maintaining information regarding ownership of headquarter 
companies. Whether these measures are an appropriate means for obtaining ownership 
information is discussed further in chapter 2.4.6. 
2.4.2 Obtaining and maintaining ownership information of co-operatives 
Unless sufficient supervision and regulation exists to ensure accurate records are kept and 
maintained to identify the ownership and control of co-operatives, elected headquarter 
companies, which constitute co-operatives, may be used to hide the identity of owners. 
2.4.2.1 Measures to accurately record ownership information of co-operatives 
Upon registration, a co-operative must submit to the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission a list of its members.107 
Each co-operative must maintain a registered office in South Africa and the Companies and 
Intellectual Property Commission must be notified where this registered office is and must be 
updated when this office changes locations.108 A list of members must be maintained at the 
registered office of the co-operative. This list of members contains significant information 
and must include the following details:109 
• The name and address of each member. 
                                                            
106 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:37). 
107 Subsec 6(2)(b) of the Co-operative Act. 
108 S 20 of the Co-operative Act. 
109 Subsec 21(1)(d) of the Co-operative Act. 
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• The date on which each member became a member. 
• The dates that membership was terminated. 
• The membership fees paid, the number of membership shares owned and the amount 
of member loans. 
Maintenance of the member register is enforced through threatened punitive actions. 
Should a co-operative or its responsible officers fail to maintain a membership register, they 
may be liable to a fine, imprisonment up to 24 months or both.110 
2.4.2.2 Measures to maintain ownership information of co-operatives 
No requirement exists for co-operatives to submit changes of membership to the Companies 
and Intellectual Property Commission.111 
But co-operatives resident in South Africa are obliged to register for income tax and complete 
an income tax return annually. As in the case of South African resident companies, SARS 
must be notified of changes in shareholdings. Changes in shareholdings must be detailed 
annually in a schedule supporting the income tax return in order for the taxpayer to meet its 
reporting obligations.  Therefore, SARS is provided with information which should allow its 
systems to identify whether more details are required from a co-operative regarding changes 
in its shareholding.  
Furthermore, co-operatives electing treatment as a headquarter company are required to 
annually submit an RCH01 form in which the legal owners of the co-operatives are disclosed. 
The intentional failure to notify the SARS of a change in membership may expose 
responsible persons at the co-operatives to fines and imprisonment.112 
The requirement to maintain a membership register with the related threatened punitive 
action for failing to do so under the Co-operative Act may encourage the maintenance of 
ownership information for co-operatives.  
2.4.2.3 Conclusion 
South Africa is primarily reliant on upfront disclosure and investigative means for obtaining 
information regarding ownership of co-operatives electing treatment as headquarter 
                                                            
110 Subsec 92(3) of the Co-operative Act. 
111 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012: 34). 
112 See chapter 2.4.1.3. 
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companies. Whether these measures are an appropriate means for obtaining ownership 
information is discussed further in chapter 2.4.6. 
2.4.3 Obtaining and maintaining ownership information where foreign companies 
qualify as headquarter companies 
A company incorporated in a foreign country may be resident in South Africa and therefore 
qualify for election as a headquarter company. The risk posed is that South African 
authorities may not have the means to collect ownership information maintained by persons 
beyond South Africa's information gathering legislation. 
2.4.3.1 Measures to accurately record ownership information of foreign companies 
All companies tax resident in South Africa must register for income tax.113 
However, on initial registration for income tax, no ownership information is required from 
the company.114 
2.4.3.2 Measures to maintain ownership information of foreign companies 
As in the case of South African incorporated companies and co-operatives, SARS must be 
notified of changes in shareholdings. These changes must be detailed annually in a schedule 
supporting the income tax return in order for the taxpayer to meet its reporting obligations. 
Therefore, SARS is provided with information which should allow its systems to identify 
whether more details are required from a company regarding changes to its shareholdings.115 
Furthermore, foreign companies electing to be treated as a headquarter company are required 
annually to submit an RCH01 form in which the legal owners of the foreign company are 
disclosed.  
2.4.3.3 Enforcement of requirements to record and maintain ownership information 
As with South African incorporated companies and co-operatives, a public officer would 
need to be appointed by a foreign incorporated company, which is South African tax 
                                                            
113 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:22) read with subsec 67(1) of the Income 
Tax Act. 
114 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:22). 
115 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:23). 
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resident.116 Public officers of a foreign company would be held responsible for defaults of 
that company.117 
The public officer of a foreign company which is tax resident in South Africa, who is 
convicted of failing to record and disclose changes in its ownership, would be subject to a 
fine or imprisonment not exceeding two years.118 South African authorities have in recent 
times successfully sought convictions against persons for tax-related offences. It would 
appear that the South African authorities do effectively impose the punitive actions of tax 
legislation.119 
2.4.3.4 Conclusion 
South African tax legislation contains punitive provisions which may encourage the accurate 
recording and updating of ownership information of foreign incorporated companies.  
South Africa is primarily reliant on upfront disclosure and investigative means for acquiring 
and maintaining information regarding ownership of foreign incorporated, headquarter 
companies. Whether these measures are an appropriate means for obtaining ownership 
information is considered further in chapter 2.4.6. 
2.4.4 Obtaining and maintaining ownership information where foreign foundations or 
foreign trusts qualify as headquarter companies 
A trust or a foundation established in a foreign country may qualify as a South African 
resident company for tax purposes thereby qualifying for election as a headquarter company. 
A significant risk posed is that the South African headquarter companies regime may be 
utilised, in the form a foreign foundation or trust, to hide the identity of the beneficial owner 
of the headquarter company.   
                                                            
116 Subsec 246(1) of the Tax Administration Act requires every company undertaking business or having an 
office in South Africa to be represented by a public officer. It is submitted that a foreign company which is 
effectively managed in South Africa, would be undertaking business or would have an office in South 
Africa.   
117 Subsec 246(5) of the Tax Administration Act. 
118 Subsec 234(d)-(e) of the Tax administration Act. 
119 Refer to chapter 2.4.1.3. 
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2.4.4.1 Measures to accurately record ownership information of and foreign trusts 
A foreign foundation or foreign trust which wishes to elect to be treated as a headquarter 
company must register in South Africa for income tax.120 
As in the case of other companies, on initial registration for income tax, no ownership 
information is required to be supplied.121 
2.4.4.2 Measures to maintain ownership information of foreign foundations and foreign 
trusts 
Foreign trusts or foreign foundations electing headquarter company treatment are required to 
submit an RCH01 form. In order to complete the RCH01 form it is submitted that the details 
of the beneficiaries of these vehicles must be maintained. 
2.4.4.3 Enforcement of requirements to record and maintain ownership information 
Registration as a South African resident company would require the appointment of a public 
officer, who is South African tax resident.122 Public officers of a foreign foundation or 
foreign trust would be held responsible for defaults of that company.123 
A public officer of a South African tax resident company, would face the threat of penalties 
and imprisonment.124 
2.4.4.4 Conclusion 
South African tax legislation contains punitive provisions which may encourage the accurate 
recording and updating of ownership information of foreign foundations and trusts.  
South Africa is primarily reliant on upfront disclosure and investigative means for acquiring 
and maintaining information regarding ownership of foreign foundations and trusts electing 
headquarter company treatment. Whether these are appropriate means for obtaining 
ownership information is considered further in chapter 2.4.6. 
                                                            
120 Subsec 67(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
121 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:22). 
122 Subsec 246(1) of the Tax Administration Act requires every company undertaking business or having an 
office in South Africa to be represented by a public officer. It is submitted that a foreign company which is 
effectively managed in South Africa, would be undertaking business or would have an office in South 
Africa.   
123 Subsec 246(5) of the Tax Administration Act. 
124 Subsec 234(d)-(e) of the Tax administration Act. 
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2.4.5 Obtaining ownership information where nominee shareholders are appointed 
Nominee shareholders, including service providers, may be appointed in terms of the 
Companies Act.  Measures in place to identify the beneficial owner who has authorised the 
use of nominee shareholders is discussed further. 
2.4.5.1 Legislated notification by nominee shareholders of the legal owner 
Nominee shareholders of public companies are required to notify the company of the identity 
of the legal owner of the shares within five days of the end of the month in which such legal 
ownership in the shares changed.125 
All companies which have reason to believe that nominee shareholders have been appointed 
may require the nominee shareholders to disclose the legal owner of the said shares.126 The 
nominee shareholder has ten business days from the requested date to provide the legal 
owner's identity.127 
In instances where a nominee shareholder provides false or misleading information about the 
legal owner of the shares and with fraudulent intent, that nominee shareholder may be subject 
to any combination of a fine and imprisonment of up to ten years.128 
Service providers, such as lawyers, accountants and financial institutions, may act as nominee 
shareholders.  
Service providers that are "accountable institutions” are subject to the Financial Centre 
Intelligence Act.129 Where these "accountable institutions" act professionally as nominee 
shareholders, the service providers would need to take steps to identify who they are acting 
for and they would need to maintain such ownership information.130 Failure to do so could 
expose them to a significant fine not exceeding R 100 million or a period of imprisonment 
not exceeding 15 years.131 
Notably members of accounting bodies, such as the South African Institute of Chartered 
Accountants, are specifically excluded from acting as “accountable institutions".132 Prudent 
                                                            
125 Subsec 56(3) and subsec 56(4) of the Companies Act. 
126 Subsec 56(5) of the Companies Act. 
127 Subsec 56(6) of the Companies Act.  
128 Subsec 214(1)(b) and subsec 216(a) of the Companies Act. 
129 First Schedule to the Financial Centre Intelligence Act, No. 38 of 2001. 2001. Pretoria: Government Printer 
("the Financial Centre Intelligence Act"). 
130 Subsec 22 and subsec 23 of the Financial Centre Intelligence Act. 
131 Subsec 68(1) the Financial Centre Intelligence Act . 
132 First Schedule to the Financial Centre Intelligence Act. 
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members of recognised professional bodies should however consider their ethical 
responsibilities under their respective codes of conduct, when acting in a nominee capacity. 
The considerable threat of the punitive actions imposed by professional bodies for acting 
improperly through intentionally or negligently concealing the identity of shareholders may 
ensure that these service providers keep accurate records and share information regarding 
legal owners. Furthermore, these providers may be wary of provisions in South African tax 
legislation which permit SARS to alert professional bodies of instances where professionals 
have failed to meet rules or codes of conduct.133 
2.4.5.2 Conclusion 
Sufficient upfront disclosure by persons acting as nominee shareholders needs to be provided 
to both private and public companies, thereby creating a mechanism for identifying the true 
legal owners of companies. Significant enforcement provisions are in place both in terms of 
the Financial Centre Intelligence Act and the extensive penalties imposed by professional 
bodies on service providers who act as nominee shareholders and who fail to maintain and 
share details of who they are acting for. These provisions should act as a significant deterrent 
to the abuse of nominee shareholders.  
Ownership information provided by nominee shareholders to companies would not be 
automatically provided to authorities. Information about the identity of the legal owner of 
shares would therefore be required to be gathered through investigative means. Whether this 
is an appropriate means for obtaining ownership information is considered further in chapter 
2.4.6. 
2.4.6 Means employed by South Africa as an effective manner for gathering 
ownership information 
Measures exist both in South African taxation and company legislation which require 
maintenance of ownership information related to entities which may qualify as headquarter 
companies. 
For all of these qualifying entities, upfront disclosure and investigative means are required to 
obtain such ownership information. In particular, an investigative means must be employed to 
                                                            
133 Subsec 241(1)(c) of the Tax Administration Act permits SARS to report any person to a professional body 
should that person's conduct contravene a rule or code of conduct of the professional body for which 
disciplinary action may be taken. 
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identify the beneficial owners of headquarter companies where nominee shareholdings are 
present. 
The following discussion sets out whether the South African legal and administrative system 
is best suited to use upfront disclosure and investigative means for obtaining ownership 
information. 
2.4.6.1 Adequacy of steps taken to confirm accuracy of upfront disclosures 
When relying on upfront disclosure to identify the owners of corporate vehicles, the identities 
of these owners must be accurately disclosed throughout the vehicle’s existence.134 
This information must be provided on a timely basis, preferably in the form of a declaration, 
to ensure the accuracy of this disclosure.135 Effective enforcement of punitive measures must 
ensure that persons making declarations are encouraged to supply necessary information and 
are deterred from supplying inaccurate information.136 Furthermore, there must be sufficient 
competent staff to vet the ownership submissions and to ensure that they are submitted on 
time.137 
In the case of headquarter companies, the ownership of these entities has to be disclosed 
annually in an RCH01 declaration and therefore ownership information is declared 
throughout the existence of these entities. 
As discussed in chapter 2.4.1.3 South Africa has significant punitive measures and has the 
will to use these measures. It is therefore submitted that sufficient punitive measures are in 
place to encourage accurate and timely disclosure of ownership information for headquarter 
companies. 
Whether personnel at SARS routinely verify the accuracy of ownership information declared 
is uncertain. However, it is submitted that if South Africa has an effective legal and 
administrative environment to promote an investigative means for obtaining information, 
these ownership details declared, can be vetted.  
Therefore, if South Africa’s legal and administrative environment contains necessary 
elements, it is submitted that the combined upfront disclosure and investigative means 
employed by South Africa to obtain ownership information for headquarter companies will 
                                                            
134 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001:79) 
135 Ibid at 80. 
136 Ibid at 81. 
137 Ibid at 80. 
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be appropriate. Whether the necessary elements are in place to ensure the effectiveness of 
South Africa’s investigative means is discussed below.    
2.4.6.2 South Africa's compulsory powers to obtain information 
A system relying on investigative means for obtaining information would require strong 
powers vested in authorities to gather such information and a comprehensive and a competent 
investigative unit.138 
The Tax Administration Act contains the primary legislative authority for SARS to obtain 
information from persons. Section 46(1) of the Tax Administration Act reads: 
"SARS may for the purposes of the administration of a tax Act in relation to a 
taxpayer, whether identified by name or otherwise objectively identifiable, require the 
taxpayer or another person to, within a reasonable period, submit relevant material 
(whether orally or in writing) that SARS requires." 
A request for information by the SARS must therefore satisfy five elements: 
1. The request must be for the purposes of the administration of a tax Act. 
2. A taxpayer must be the subject of the administration under a tax Act. 
3. The taxpayer must be identified by name or otherwise objectively identifiable. 
4. The request may be made to the taxpayer or any other person. 
5. The request must be for relevant material. 
It is submitted that the final element of this information gathering provision would be met if 
the first two elements are in place. The words, "for the purposes of" in element 1, qualify the 
phrase “relevant material", contemplated in element 5. Therefore "relevant material" would 
include information required for the purposes of the administration of a tax Act in relation to 
a taxpayer. So should ownership information of a headquarter company be required for the 
administration of a tax Act in relation to a taxpayer, element 5 would be met. 
The application of these remaining elements is discussed further in light of ownership 
information relevant to a headquarter company. 
 
 
                                                            
138 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001:84). 
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2.4.6.2.1 Is ownership information of headquarter companies required for the 
administration of a tax Act? 
A tax Act would include both the Tax Administration Act and the Income Tax Act.139 
It is submitted that ownership information of headquarter companies would be required for 
the administration of these companies in terms of the Income Tax Act.   
Section 9I (1) of the Income Tax Act which provides administrative provisions in relation to 
headquarter companies reads: 
"9I.   Headquarter companies.—(1) Any company that— 
(a)is a resident; and 
(b)complies with the requirements prescribed by subsection (2), 
may elect in the form and manner determined by the Commissioner to be a headquarter    
company for a year of assessment of that company." 
 It is submitted that the use of the words "in the form and manner" in this provision would 
permit SARS a discretion to request information that is relevant in determining whether the 
entity qualifies as a headquarter company. The information which may be gathered to assess 
whether these qualifying criteria are met would include the details of the ownership of the 
headquarter company.140 The details of the owners in the share register of companies may be 
required by SARS to verify whether in fact all shareholders of the company hold equity 
shares and voting rights which would qualify the company for headquarter company election. 
It is further submitted that this ownership information may be required by SARS to fulfil its 
obligations to provide information requested under an international tax agreement. South 
Africa is obliged to provide information rendered for tax purposes to assist the administration 
of a foreign country with which South Africa has a tax agreement providing for the exchange 
of information.141 A request by a foreign country with which South Africa may exchange 
                                                            
139 Subsec 1 of the Tax Administration Act read with subsec 4 of the SARS Act, No 34 of 1997. 1997. Pretoria:  
Government Printer. 
140 Refer to chapter 2.4.1.3 for previous discussions in this regard. 
141 Subsec 108(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
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information under an international tax agreement may include a request for ownership 
information relevant to the administration or collection of taxes in that foreign country.142 
It is therefore submitted that information regarding the ownership of a headquarter company 
may be required for the administration of a tax Act. 
2.4.6.2.2 Would a person holding ownership information of a headquarter company be a 
taxpayer? 
The definition of "taxpayer" includes a person who is the subject of a request to provide 
assistance under an international agreement.143 
As noted in chapter 2.4.6.2.1, a request from a foreign country to share ownership 
information under an international tax agreement would be for the purpose of administering 
the Income Tax Act.  
Therefore any person who has access to ownership information of a headquarter company 
and is required by SARS to provide that information in terms of a request under an 
international tax agreement would be considered a "taxpayer". 
2.4.6.2.3 Is the "taxpayer" of a headquarter company readily identifiable? 
All entities wishing to elect treatment as a headquarter company would need to be a company 
as defined in the Income Tax Act.144 A company as defined in the Income Tax Act bears the 
same meaning in the Tax Administration Act.145 All companies would require the 
appointment of a public officer who would be responsible for complying with the provisions 
of taxing Acts. Furthermore, the appointed public officer must reside in South Africa.146 
In practice it should be possible to identify and burden the public officer of a headquarter 
company with the request for ownership details of that company.  
It is therefore submitted that the "taxpayer" burdened with a request for information would be 
readily identifiable. 
                                                            
142 In CSARS v Werner van Kets (2011) 74 SATC 9 no argument was placed before the Court or 
considered by the Court limiting the information which could be provided under an international 
tax agreement.  
143 Subsec 151(e) of the Tax Administration Act. 
144 Refer to chapter 2.2.1. 
145 Subsec 1 of the Tax Administration Act. 
146 Subsec 246 (1) and subsec 246 (5) of the Tax Administration Act. 
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2.4.6.2.4 Could the request for ownership be directed to another person other than the 
taxpayer? 
The request may require the taxpayer or any other accountable person to provide the 
requested information. The information may therefore be obtained from any accountable 
person without any apparent limitation.  
The common law duty of confidentiality which may exist between persons and a company 
would be overridden by the Tax Administration Act. Furthermore, attorney-client privilege in 
South African law would not permit a service provider to ignore a request to share 
confidential information due to secrecy provisions.147 
2.4.6.2.5 Conclusion as to whether South Africa has compulsory powers to share 
ownership information of headquarter companies 
The Tax Administration Act read with the Income Tax Act provides a mechanism which in 
practice should allow SARS to gather ownership information in relation to headquarter 
companies. 
No secrecy provisions exist which can prevent any accountable person from denying a 
request to share this particular information. 
2.4.6.3 Availability of resources to gather information relating to the ownership of 
headquarter companies 
Adequate resources should be in place to further the effective collection of ownership 
information.148 
The Division of Enforcement Risk Planning within SARS is empowered to obtain 
information and exchange information under an exchange of information request.149 
The officers of this division have direct access to the SARS core systems and other external 
systems. In complicated cases where such information is not available, an audit specialist 
from the local branch office of SARS will be tasked to obtain the information from the 
taxpayer.150 
                                                            
147 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:55). 
148 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001:84). 
149 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:50). 
150 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:51). 
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Both the audit specialists and officers of the Enforcement Risk Planning Division receive 
training in exchange of information.151 
Results of exchange of information requests in practice show that 80% are resolved within 90 
days and a further 10% are resolved within 180 days.152 These statistics appear to indicate 
that there is sufficient adequately trained and resourced staff available to investigate matters 
concerning ownership information.    
The delegation of responsibility to obtain ownership information to dedicated and skilled 
staff should ensure the supply of ownership information under South Africa's investigative 
system. 
In conclusion, it does appear that South Africa has sufficient resources to facilitate 
investigations into the ownership of headquarter companies. 
2.4.6.4 Effectively functioning judicial system enforcing access to ownership information 
An effective judicial system should be in place in South Africa to enforce record keeping 
requirements and to enforce accessing of information.153  
As identified in chapter 2.4.1.3, the South African judicial system has successfully imposed 
convictions on persons who intentionally disregard responsibilities imposed on them by 
South African tax legislation. 
The Cape High Court handed down a decision requiring a South African resident to provide 
information under the double tax agreement between South Africa and Australia.154 
This and other instances suggests that the judicial system is capable of enforcing punitive 
measures and provisions aimed at accessing information both in terms of local legislation and 
international tax agreements. 
 
 
                                                            
151 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:77). 
152 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:73). 
153 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001:84). 
154 CSARS v Werner van Kets (2011) 74 SATC 9. 
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2.5 The capability of South African authorities to share ownership information with 
foreign jurisdictions 
It should not be possible for information to be exchanged between countries unless a legal 
basis exists for doing so.155 
To ensure that South Africa is capable of exchanging ownership information of headquarter 
companies efficiently, it is necessary for South Africa to have a sufficiently developed 
network of agreements which provide a basis for sharing ownership information. 
Furthermore, legislation should ensure that such agreements are effective and binding in 
law.156 
2.5.1 Effectiveness of South African exchange of information agreements 
2.5.1.1 Effect of international information sharing agreements in South African law 
Section 108(1) of the Income Tax Act provides a means for the South African Government to 
conclude international agreements which provide for exchange of information on tax matters. 
Approval of such agreements by Parliament and notice of the conclusion of the agreements in 
the Government Gazette ensures that such agreements are effective as part of South African 
law.157 
All of the international agreements providing for exchange of information, currently in force, 
have been given effect as required by the South African Constitution. Therefore information 
exchange agreements in force are effective in South African law.158 
2.5.1.2 Agreements concluded permit the exchange of foreseeably relevant information 
A number of South Africa's agreements facilitating the exchange of information have been 
concluded without the express term that information which is “foreseeably relevant” should 
be exchanged.159 
The "foreseeably relevant" standard has been implemented to permit as widely as possible the 
exchange of information which would be requested by a contracting state.160 
                                                            
155 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:59). 
156 Ibid. 
157 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2012:67). 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid at 62. 
160 Ibid at 61. 
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Despite the express absence of the terms “ foreseeably relevant” in certain double tax 
agreements, South Africa will in most instances interpret the provisions of an agreement in a 
manner that is consistent with the standard of foreseeable relevance.161 
However, a concern is noted in the double tax agreement with Switzerland. This agreement 
provides for the sharing of information only if the information requested relates to carrying 
out taxing provisions in response to tax fraud.162 This limitation may severely impair the 
ability of South African authorities to share information relating to the ownership of 
headquarter companies with Swiss authorities, as presumably not all requests for this 
information would pertain to tax fraud investigations. 
South African authorities have not denied a request for information in the past three years, on 
the grounds that the information is not “foreseeably relevant”.163 So despite the limitations 
imposed in the double tax agreement with Switzerland, South Africa may provide 
information in the spirit of such information exchange agreements. What would remain to be 
seen is whether that spirit would remain unbroken should Switzerland refuse a request from 
South Africa in light of the request not being in relation to a tax fraud investigation. 
2.5.1.3 The South African authority’s ability to share ownership information under 
international tax agreements   
Effective exchange of information requires that ownership information be provided 
regardless of any domestic restrictions which may prevent the obtaining and sharing of 
sensitive information, including ownership information.164 
As noted in chapter 2.4.6.2, measures exist in South African law to permit the fiscal   
authorities the right to gather ownership information without interference from any 
confidentiality and secrecy laws. 
There should be no cause for concern that South Africa is incapable of obtaining and sharing 
ownership information of headquarter companies in response to a request for an exchange of 
information.165 
                                                            
161 Ibid at 62. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid at 63. 
165 Ibid at 64. 
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2.5.1.4 No domestic tax interest requirement for exchange of information 
A number of the double tax agreements concluded by South Africa do not explicitly require 
information to be shared, if this information is not relevant to the enforcement of its own tax 
laws.166 However, there are no restrictions in South African law to the effect that a request 
from a treaty partner would be denied for the reason that South Africa is not interested in that 
information.167 
2.5.1.5 Dual criminality as a requirement for exchange of information 
Exchange of information should not be stifled due to a requirement that information be 
shared only in cases where dual criminality exists. The principle of dual criminality requires 
the conduct that is being investigated to constitute a criminal offence in both states.168 
Only the double tax agreement with Switzerland would possibly derail a request for an 
exchange of ownership information on the basis that the conduct being investigated does not 
constitute a criminal offence subject to imprisonment under the laws of both contracting 
states. 
As a result a request for exchange of ownership information would be significantly hampered 
should a Swiss resident hold an ownership interest in a headquarter company in South Africa. 
It is for this reason that it is recommended that this double tax agreement be amended to 
remove the dual criminality principle.169 
2.5.2 Exchange of ownership information with all relevant partners 
Sharing ownership information of headquarter companies should be possible with all relevant 
partners.170 
South Africa has actively concluded and enforced international agreements containing 
exchange of information measures with more than 90 countries.171 South Africa is able to 
                                                            
166 Ibid at 64.  
167 Ibid at 65. 
168 Ibid at 65. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid at 68. 
171 Article 26 of the Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 2010, provides for an effective means to 
share information between the competent authorities of contracting states. The majority of double tax 
agreements concluded by South Africa contain similar if not identical wording to article 26 of the Model Tax 
Convention and therefore South Africa can effectively exchange information with its treaty partners. Where 
double tax agreements do not include this wording, protocols amending the exchange of information articles 
have been or are in the process of being negotiated to amend the exchange of information articles. Where 
South Africa has not concluded a double tax agreement, 16 tax exchange of information agreements have 
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exchange information through agreements with its major trading partners, all of the G20 
member countries and the majority of OECD member countries.172 
In conclusion South Africa has a significant tax treaty network which allows for exchange of 
information. Further development of this treaty network would assist in preventing the 
Headquarter Company regime from being used to conceal owners' identities through 
investing via a jurisdiction with which South Africa does not have an international agreement 
allowing for exchange of information. 
2.5.3 Conclusion as to whether ownership information of headquarter companies may 
be effectively shared 
South Africa has measures in place to give effect to international agreements which provide 
for exchange of information between states. These measures are passed into and form part of 
South African law thereby providing a means for ownership information of headquarter 
companies to be shared. 
South Africa has actively pursued the conclusion of international agreements allowing the 
exchange of information and should continue to expand these information exchange 
agreements to prevent the concealment of ownership information of headquarter companies 
through investment channelled via non-treaty partners. 
To a large extent, international agreements concluded by South Africa provide an effective 
means to share ownership information which is “foreseeably relevant” in the administration 
of taxing acts both at home and in other countries. 
However, the double tax agreement between South Africa and Switzerland could undermine 
the effective exchange of information relating to the ownership of headquarter companies. 
The double tax agreement concluded with Switzerland should, therefore, be amended to 
permit the exchange of information beyond that required in investigating criminal, fraud tax 
cases. This double tax agreement should also remove the principle of dual criminality. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
been and or are in the process of being concluded. South Africa has focussed on concluding tax information 
exchange agreements with traditional secrecy and low-tax jurisdictions. Refer to appendices H and I for 
further details regarding tax information exchange agreements which have been concluded or are in the 
process of negotiation.  
172 Ibid at 68. 
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2.6 Conclusion - South African Headquarter Companies regime as a fiscally 
transparent holding company regime 
Measures in South Africa require the ownership information of headquarter companies to be 
maintained. Punitive action under tax and other legislation provides a means to enforce the 
maintenance of ownership information. 
Ownership information of headquarter companies is currently required to be submitted to 
SARS, in terms of an annual RCH01 declaration. This annual declaration must be completed 
and submitted to secure the headquarter company status.  
South Africa relies on an upfront disclosure and an investigative system to obtain ownership 
information of headquarter companies. Practice and legislated measures in place in South 
Africa should ensure an effective means for obtaining ownership details for headquarter 
companies. 
South Africa would to a large degree be capable of sharing ownership information of 
headquarter companies. It is recommended that South Africa seek to conclude more 
international agreements providing an effective means to share ownership information which 
is “foreseeably relevant” in the administration of taxing acts in other countries. The double 
tax agreement concluded with Switzerland needs to be amended to reflect transparency 
standards to prevent investments being made via Switzerland into the South African 
headquarter companies regime with the goal to conceal the identity of owners. 
It is submitted that to a large extent the South African headquarter companies regime does 
not permit the concealment of owners’ details and therefore should bear the imprint of a 
fiscally transparent holding company regime.  
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3. Mauritius as a fiscally transparent holding company regime 
3.1 Mauritian Global Business Licence regime 
Mauritius has sought to attract foreign investment and secure employment of its skilled, 
professional workforce. A significant effort in this regard has been the introduction of the 
Global Business Licence (GBL) offering which exists in its current form under the enactment 
of the Financial Services Act.173 
The GBL regime offers investors a number of options in which to implement the holding of 
foreign entities. Coupled with the flexibility of the legal form of these entities, the regime 
offers lucrative tax concessions.  
3.2 Qualifying criteria for a corporation obtaining a GBL1 or GBL2 licence 
If an applicant meets the qualifying criteria and specific requirements, global business 
licences are issued by the Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (FSC). These 
requirements and criteria are discussed further. 
3.2.1 Mauritian resident corporation 
Only a Mauritian resident corporation conducting business outside of Mauritius may apply 
for a GBL1 or GBL2 registration.174 
3.2.1.1 What is envisaged by a Mauritian resident corporation? 
Any of the following persons qualify as a Mauritian resident corporation:175 
• A company incorporated under the Companies Act176. 
• A company registered under the Mauritian Companies Act. 
• A société registered in Mauritius. 
• A partnership registered in Mauritius. 
• A trust. 
• Any other body of persons established under the laws of Mauritius. 
 
 
                                                            
173 The Financial Services Act, No.14 of 2007. 2007. Port Louis: Government Printing Department. (Mauritius) 
(“the Financial Services Act”). 
174 Subsec 71(1) of the Financial Services Act. 
175 Subsec 71(7) of the Financial Services Act. 
176 Companies Act, No.15 of 2001.2001. Port Louis: Government Printing Department. (Mauritius). (“Mauritian     
Companies Act”). 
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Incorporation under the Mauritian Companies Act 
The Mauritian Companies Act allows for the incorporation of both public and private 
companies which may be: 
• limited by the value of unpaid shares177; or 
• limited by a guarantee given by its members178; or 
• limited by a combination of the value of unpaid shares and members' guarantees179; or 
• an unlimited company180. 
Registration under the Mauritian Companies Act 
A foreign company would be registered under the Mauritian Companies Act, if that company 
carries on business or has its place of business in Mauritius.181 
No exhaustive list exists as to what constitutes carrying on a business in Mauritius.182 
However, the mere meeting of directors and the maintenance of a bank account in Mauritius 
would not in itself mean that the foreign company is carrying on business in Mauritius.183 
Whilst in law it is possible for a foreign company to register under the Mauritian Companies 
Act, it is the practice of the FSC to reject global business licence applications by foreign 
companies.184 
A société registered in Mauritius 
A société is a partnership which may be formed under Titre Neuvième of Livre Troisième of 
the Code Civil Mauricien and Titre Troisième of Livre Premier of the Code de Commerce.  
Partners of a general partnership, known as a société en nom collectif, are fully exposed to the 
liabilities of the partnership. General partners of a limited partnership, known as a société en 
commandite simple, are fully exposed to the partnership’s liabilities, whilst the limited 
partners are only liable for the partnership’s debts to the extent of their capital 
contributions.185 
                                                            
177 Subsec 21(2)(a) of the Mauritian Companies Act. 
178 Subsec 21(2)(b) of the Mauritian Companies Act. 
179 Subsec 21(2)(c) of the Mauritian Companies Act. 
180 Subsec 21(2)(d) of the Mauritian Companies Act. 
181 Subsec 276 of the Mauritian Companies Act. 
182 Refer to Subsec 274 of the Mauritian Companies Act. 
183 Subsec 274(b)(ii)-(iii) of the Mauritian Companies Act. 
184 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. 2011. Global Forum on Transparency and 
Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes Peer Reviews: Mauritius: Combined Phase 1+ Phase 2. OECD 
Publishing. Footnote 11 at 20. 
185 Ibid at 27. 
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A limited partnership registered in Mauritius 
A limited partnership may be established to do business within Mauritius with persons within 
and outside of Mauritius.186 
The activities of a société would continue to be regulated by the Code Civil Mauricien or the 
Code de Commerce and not the Partnerships Act.187 However, where a société is a partner of 
a limited partnership, the société must comply with the Partnerships Act in respect of its 
partnership interest in the limited partnership.    
The partners may elect that the limited partnership be treated as a separate legal entity.188 
A limited partnership comprises both general and limited partners. The general partners are 
fully exposed to the liabilities of the partnership, despite its registration as a separate legal 
entity.189 A limited partner is not generally exposed to the debts of the partnership in excess 
of the partner’s contribution. Exceptions are if the partnership fails to comply with the 
Partnerships Act or if the partnership agreement specifies otherwise.190 Both general and 
limited partners may be an individual, an incorporated or an unincorporated person and may 
include a société or another partnership.191 
A trust  
A trust recognised in terms of the Trusts Act192 could receive a global business licence.193 
A trust would exist where a person (“trustee”) holds or has vested rights in assets, but not as 
the owner, and is obliged to control these assets for the benefit of another person (a 
beneficiary).194 
A foreign trust is recognised and enforceable under the Trusts Act, subject to its activities  
not contravening the laws of Mauritius; that they are not immoral or contrary to public 
policy; and to the extent that the foreign trust does not control immovable property in 
                                                            
186 The Limited Partnerships Act, No. 28 of 2011. 2011. Port Louis: Government Printing Department. 
(Mauritius).  ("the Partnerships Act") - see Subsec 10(1). 
187 Subsec 3 of the Partnerships Act. 
188 Subsec 11 of the Partnerships Act. 
189 Subsec 12(1)(a)(ii) of the Partnerships Act. 
190 Subsec 12(1)(b)(iii) of the Partnerships Act. 
191 Subsec 12(2) and subsec 12(3) of the Partnerships Act. 
192 The Trusts Act, No. 14 of 2001. 2001. Port Louis: Government Printing Department. (Mauritius).  ("the 
Trusts Act"). 
193 Subsec 1 of the Financial Services Act – see definition of “trust”. 
194 Subsec 3 of the Trusts Act. 
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Mauritius.195 Therefore a foreign trust which meets the definition of a trust in the Trusts Act 
could qualify as a Mauritian resident corporation.  
Any other body of persons established under the laws of Mauritius 
There is no exhaustive list of bodies of persons which would qualify under these criteria.  
A foundation established and registered under the Foundations Act, is an example of a body 
of persons established under the laws of Mauritius.196 A foundation may be established in 
Mauritius to undertake the purposes specified in its charter.197 A foundation may conduct 
charitable or non-charitable purposes for the benefit of identified persons or classes of 
persons; or it may conduct specific purposes.198 
Until the foundation has applied to be registered, it will not be seen to be a person distinct 
under the laws of Mauritius.199 
3.2.1.2 Mauritian resident corporation must envisage conducting business outside of 
Mauritius 
A Mauritian resident corporation must show that its purpose includes undertaking business 
outside of Mauritius. The ultimate purpose test, with relevant circumstances must indicate 
that the corporation is to conduct global business. This ultimate purpose test effectively 
enquires into whether the ultimate purpose of the company is investing or providing services 
outside of Mauritius.200 
3.2.2 Additional qualifying criteria for GBL1 registration 
In approving a GBL1 registration, the FSC will consider whether the conduct of the 
corporation is managed and controlled from Mauritius.201 It will make its judgement based on 
the following factors:202 
• Does the corporation have at least two directors, resident in Mauritius, of sufficient 
calibre to exercise independence of mind and judgement? 
                                                            
195 Subsec 60 of the Trusts Act. 
196 The Foundations Act, No. 8 of 2012. 2012. Port Louis: Government Printing Department. (Mauritius).  ("the 
Foundations Act"). 
197 Subsec 3(1) of the Foundations Act. 
198 Subsec 3(3) of the Foundations Act. 
199 Subsec 5(2) of the Foundations Act. 
200 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius. 2007. Circular Letter CL 201207: New Conceptual Approach to 
Global Business. Available: http://www.fscmauritius.org/media/52922/cl201207.pdf [4 September 2013] 
201 Subsec 71(4)(a) of the Financial Services Act. 
202 Subsec 71(4)(b) of the Financial Services Act. 
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• Does the corporation maintain at all times its principal bank account in Mauritius? 
• Does the corporation keep and maintain, at all times, its accounting records at its 
registered office in Mauritius? 
• Does the corporation prepare or proposes to prepare its statutory financial statements 
and causes or proposes to have such financial statements audited in Mauritius? 
• Does the corporation provide for meetings of directors to include at least two directors 
from Mauritius? 
3.2.3 Additional qualifying criteria for GBL2 registration 
Only private companies incorporated under the Mauritian Companies Act may apply for a 
GBL2 registration. Furthermore, a GBL2 corporation may not conduct the following 
activities:203 
• Banking. 
• Financial services. 
• Carrying out the business of holding or managing or otherwise dealing with a 
collective investment fund or scheme as a professional functionary. 
• Providing of registered office facilities, nominee services, directorship services, 
secretarial services or other services for corporations. 
• Providing trusteeship services by way of business. 
3.3 Factors presented by the Global Business Licence regime which may roadblock 
the identification and exchange of ownership information 
The Mauritian Global Business Licence regime contains factors which may inherently pose a 
threat to obtaining and sharing information relating to the owners of these corporations. 
Inherent factors which are relevant to this regime are discussed further. 
3.3.1 Form of GBL1 and GBL2 corporations 
The definition of a Mauritian resident corporation allows a number of corporate entities to 
qualify for a GBL1 registration. However, only a private company incorporated under the 
Mauritian Companies Act may qualify for a GBL2 registration. 
The form of these qualifying corporations exhibits characteristics which may prevent the 
identification of beneficial owners.  
                                                            
203 Subsec 71(3) of the Financial Services Act. 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
An investigation into whether the South African and 
Mauritian preferential holding company regimes may 




As private limited liability companies ordinarily face less regulation, these entities have been 
specifically identified as a vehicle in which to aid anonymity.204 
Both GBL1 and GBL2 corporations may take the form of private limited liability companies. 
GBL1 and GBL2 private companies therefore inherently offer the cloak of anonymity unless 
sufficient supervision and regulation requires the identity of these owners to be accurately 
recorded and maintained. 
3.3.2 Mauritian and foreign trusts 
A trust which may qualify as a GBL1 corporation would be established by contractual 
arrangements between a founder and designated trustees. Given the limited number of parties 
who are subject to the rights and obligations established under a trust and given the private 
nature of a trust, trusts are left largely unregulated by authorities.205 This lack of regulation 
creates the opportunity for the settlors and beneficiaries of trusts to go unrecorded.   
In a number of jurisdictions it is possible to create trusts which assist in hiding the identity of 
the beneficiaries of the trust. For instance, blind trusts may be used in certain jurisdictions to 
facilitate tax evasion through the non-disclosure of the beneficiaries in the trust deed.206 
3.3.3 Mauritian and foreign foundations 
Foundations may also face little supervision and regulation by authorities. Where supervision 
and regulation is absent the foundation’s documents would not be publicly available and 
nominee founders could be used to conceal the identities of founders and beneficiaries.207 
Foundations holding a global business licence could be utilised to hide the identities of 
beneficiaries and founders.   
3.3.4 Mauritian and foreign limited liability partnerships 
Authorities may not require limited partners to register with authorities. The concealment of a 
beneficial owner of a limited liability partnership can be furthered where a limited partner 
                                                            
204 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001:23). 
205 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001:25). 
206 Olivier, L & Honiball, M (2011:132). 
207 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001:27-28). 
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appoints a nominee general partner or where a limited partner is in de facto control of the 
general partner.208 
Should registration of the limited partners not be required, both foreign and local limited 
liability partnerships offer the inherent ability to conceal the limited partners’ identities.  
3.3.5 Issuing of bearer shares 
Bearer shares may not be issued by companies or a société. Therefore bearer shares are not 
available to conceal the identities of the beneficial owners of these corporations.209 
3.3.6 Registration of nominee shareholders 
Nominee shareholders are recognised by the Mauritian Companies Act. Furthermore, no 
legislation exists prohibiting service providers from acting as nominee shareholders. 210 
It is therefore possible to conceal the identity of the beneficial owner of a global business 
licenced company through the use of nominee shareholders.  
3.3.7 Conclusion - identification of inherent factors presented by the Global Business 
Licence regime which may roadblock transparency standards 
The Mauritian Global Business Licence regime presents certain inherent factors which may 
prevent the identification of the owners of these corporations. The following inherent factors 
have been identified: 
• GBL1 and GBL2 corporations may take the form of a private limited liability 
company. 
• A GBL1 corporation may take the form of a local or a foreign trust. 
• A GBL1 corporation may take the form of a local or a foreign foundation. 
• A GBL1 corporation may take the form of a local or a foreign limited liability 
partnership. 
• A company licenced as a GBL1 or GBL2 corporation may issue shares to nominee 
shareholders. 
Measures implemented by the Mauritian Legislature and authorities are investigated to assess 
whether means exist to identify the beneficial owners of global business licence corporations. 
                                                            
208 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:28-29). 
209 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:26). 
210 S 1 of the Mauritian Companies Act – see definition of “nominee”.  
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3.4 Measures undertaken by the Mauritian Legislature and Mauritian authorities to 
remove impediments to identifying the owners of GBL1 and GBL2 corporations 
The Mauritian authorities, in particular the FSC, may take administrative steps to ensure the 
availability of details regarding the owners of these corporations.  
The Mauritian Legislature is responsible for providing a legal basis for the Mauritian 
authorities to gather such ownership information.  
Measures undertaken by the Mauritian Legislature and Mauritian authorities are discussed 
further to assess whether ownership information for these corporations is likely to be 
available. 
3.4.1 Obtaining and maintaining information regarding private limited liability 
companies 
Measures which assist with enforcing the recording and maintenance of records reflecting the  
ownership information of GBL1 and GBL2 private limited liability companies is considered 
further. 
3.4.1.1 Measures to accurately record ownership information of GBL1 and GBL2 private 
limited liability companies 
Ownership information for these companies is not disclosed to the Mauritius Revenue 
Authority (MRA).211 
An application for incorporating a company with the Registrar of Companies in Mauritius, 
requires the following relevant details to be provided:212 
• The full name and residential address of the legal shareholders. 
• The number of shares issued to each of the shareholders and the consideration paid for 
the shares. 
The Registrar of Companies takes no further steps to authenticate that the legal shareholders 
of these companies are in fact the beneficial owners of the companies.213 
GBL1 and GBL2 applications must be lodged via licensed management companies.214 
                                                            
211 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:18). 
212 Subsec 23(2)(d) of the Mauritian Companies Act. 
213 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:18). 
214 Subsec 72(1)(a) of the Financial Services Act. 
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In the case of an application for GBL1 registration, the company must provide supporting, 
certified copies of customer due diligence documents to a licenced management company.215 
To fulfil its responsibility to supervise and enforce compliance by a “financial institution” 
with the Financial Intelligence and Anti-Money Laundering Act216, the FSC issued the FSC’s 
Code on the Prevention of Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing (“the Code”).217 As 
management companies are licenced in terms of section 77 of the Financial Services Act, 
they must obtain and keep customer due diligence documents required under the Code.218 
In the case of an application for a GBL2 corporation, supporting customer due diligence 
documents must be obtained by the licenced management company. The management 
company must perform effective customer due diligence measures and risk profiling 
procedures throughout the relationship with the corporation and would be required to lodge 
the details of the beneficial owners of GBL2 corporations with the FSC.219 
In terms of the Code, management companies must verify the existence and must identify the 
principals of the company. In doing so, the management company must take reasonable steps 
to understand the ownership and control structure of the company, verify and establish the 
existence of the company and determine the identities of the principals of the company. The 
principals of the company include the promoters, the beneficial owners and ultimate 
beneficial owners and the directors of the company. 220 
The following guideline to achieve this verification and identification process is given:221 
• “Obtaining an original or appropriately certified copy of the certificate of 
incorporation or registration;” 
• “Checking with the relevant companies registry that the company continues to exist;” 
                                                            
215 Financial Services Act, No.14 of 2007. Financial Services (Consolidated Licensing and Fees) Rules 2008. 
2008. Government gazette. 26. 22 March. Government notice no. 47/2008.    
216 Financial Intelligence and Anti-money Laundering Act, No. 6 of 2002. 2002. Port Louis: Government 
Printing Department. (Mauritius). ("the FIAL Act") – see subsec 18(1)(c). 
217 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius. 2012. Code on the Prevention of Money Laundering & 
Terrorist Financing. Available: http://www.fscmauritius.org/media/69027/new_fsc_codefinal12.pdf  [5 
September 2013] 
218 “Financial institution” include persons who are licenced or registered in terms of subsec 77 of the FSC Act – 
see definition of “financial institutions” in s 1 of the FIAL Act. 
219 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius. 2010. Circular Letter CL03022010. Available: 
http://www.fscmauritius.org/media/52934/new%20additional%20measures%20for%20gbc%202%20(cl0302
2010).pdf [5 September 2013] 
220 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:25). 
221 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:28). 
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• “Reviewing a copy of the latest report and accounts if available (audited, where 
possible);” 
• “Obtaining details of the registered office and place of business;” 
• Verifying the identity of the principals of the company through measures prescribed 
for natural persons or legal persons, depending on the legal nature of the principal. 
 
These due diligence procedures require the management company to identify the beneficial 
owners of the company as well as the ultimate beneficial owners of the company. 
Furthermore where the beneficial or ultimate beneficial owner is a legal person, the 
management company must drill down to identify and verify the individuals who are in 
control of that legal person.222 An original or a certified copy of that individual’s national 
identity card, current passport or current driver’s licence may be used to verify the date of 
birth and the nationality of these individuals. The permanent physical addresses of these 
individuals must be verified through an original or a certified copy of a recent utility bill, a 
recent credit card or bank account statement or a recent bank reference.223 
3.4.1.2 Measures to maintain ownership information of GBL1 and GBL2 private limited 
liability companies 
Private limited liability companies incorporated in Mauritius are required to maintain a 
register of each class of issued shares. The information required to be entered into the share 
register is as follows:224 
• The name and the last known address of each person who has been a shareholder 
within the past seven years. 
• The number of shares of that class held by each shareholder within the last seven 
years. 
• The date of any issue of shares to, repurchase or redemption of shares from or transfer 
of shares by or to each shareholder within the last seven years. 
Changes in shareholding in the register of the company would reflect changes in the legal 
shareholder and would not necessarily record changes in the beneficial owner of the 
company. 
                                                            
222 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:26). 
223 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:24-25). 
224 Subsec 91(3)(a)-(c) of the Mauritian Companies Act. 
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Management companies lodging an application for a GBL1 registration undertake to maintain 
customer due diligence documentation relating to controlling shareholders. A controlling 
shareholder is considered to be any person who is able to exercise control over 20% or more 
of votes at a company’s general meeting or is able to appoint and remove directors who hold 
a majority voting right at directors’ meetings.225 
Management companies must notify the FSC of changes in the beneficial ownership of GBL2 
companies within one month of the change.226 
Depending on the assessed risk, management companies must continue to perform customer 
due diligence procedures throughout the business relationship.227 Management companies are 
also required to maintain transactional records for at least seven years. These transactional 
records would include the name and address of the customer, the beneficial owner and the 
underlying principal, any instructions received, the destination of funds, the forms of 
authority, the nature of the transactions and sale and purchase agreements.228 In maintaining 
these transactional records, a management company is well placed to identify changes in the 
beneficial owner of these companies. 
3.4.1.3 Enforcement of requirements to record and maintain ownership information 
The Mauritian Registrar of Companies has no enforcement authority for GBL1 and GBL2 
corporations.229 
The FSC is empowered through relevant laws and regulations to undertake the necessary 
administrative actions to ensure compliance by FSC licenced persons. 
The FSC may cancel a global business licence where it believes on reasonable grounds that 
this action is required to preserve the good reputation of Mauritius as a financial services 
centre; to protect or mitigate damage to the integrity of its financial services industry; or to 
protect the public at large.230 
Between 2004 and 2011, the FSC performed investigations into between 10 and 15 licensees 
per annum. In these instances, ordinarily the licensee would correct any troublesome actions 
                                                            
225 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:21). 
226 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2010:1-2). 
227 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:34).  
228 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:51). 
229 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:33). 
230 Subsec 74(5) of the Financial Services Act. 
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or the management company would prefer to stop the activities of the global business 
licensee to avoid its own licence being revoked.231 
The FSC may take disciplinary action against management companies for failing to comply 
with the Financial Services Act. This disciplinary action includes issuing private warnings or 
public censure; temporarily barring a management company from holding a licence; or the 
cancellation of a management company’s licence and the imposition of an administrative 
penalty. The FSC can also disqualify an officer of a management company from a specified 
office or position in the management company for a specified period.232 
Where a person fails to give the FSC information requested, that person faces a fine up to 1 
million Mauritian rupees (“rupees”) if convicted.233 Furthermore, where no specific penalty is 
stated, a person who fails to comply with the Financial Services Act or its regulations could 
face a fine of up to 500 000 rupees or imprisonment of no more than five years if 
convicted.234 
Practice indicates that the FSC does take punitive measures. In 2010, five global business 
licences were revoked. Whilst in 2011 and 2013 respectively one and two global business 
licences were revoked. In 2010 and 2013 respectively one and four non-global business 
licenses were revoked or suspended. Furthermore in 2013, four persons were disqualified 
from acting as officers of a person licenced under the Financial Services Act for a period of 
five years.235 
3.4.1.4 Conclusion as to the recording and maintenance of ownership information for 
GBL1 and GBL2 private limited liability companies 
Measures under the Mauritian Companies Act require the legal owners of these companies to 
be recorded and for these records to be updated. 
Recording of the beneficial ownership of these companies is the domain of the FSC. Through 
anti-money laundering codes and rules imposed on management companies, a basis exists for 
recording and maintaining the details of the beneficial owners of these companies. 
                                                            
231 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:34). 
232 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:33). 
233 Subsec 75(6) of the Financial Services Act. 
234 Subsec 90 of the Financial Services Act. 
235 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius. Media Corner. Available: http://www.fscmauritius.org/media-
publications/press-releases-communiques.aspx [10 November 2013]. 
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Therefore, measures are in place requiring details of the legal and beneficial owners of these 
companies to be recorded and updated. The enforcement of these measures is supported by 
punitive actions, for which there is recent evidence of implementation by the FSC. Therefore 
these enforcement measures are being practised to discourage non-compliance with the 
Financial Services Act and thereby to prevent GBL1 or GBL2 companies from being abused 
to shelter the identities of beneficial owners. 
The Global Business Licence regime is largely reliant on service providers (i.e. licensed 
management companies) to acquire and maintain information regarding the beneficial 
ownership of the licenced companies. Whether this is an appropriate means for obtaining 
ownership information is discussed further in chapter 3.4.6. 
3.4.2 Obtaining and maintaining beneficial ownership information for Mauritian and 
foreign trusts 
Mauritian authorities may not exercise sufficient supervision over Mauritian and foreign 
trusts and as a result GBL1 trusts may be used to conceal the identities of beneficial owners. 
The concealment of these beneficial owners could be perpetuated further should Mauritius 
permit the registration of trusts with anonymity features, such as a blind trust. These factors 
are considered further. 
3.4.2.1 Measures to accurately record ownership information of Mauritian and foreign 
trusts 
Requirements for recording the details of beneficiaries of GBL1 trusts are set out in terms of 
the Trusts Act, the Mauritian Income Tax Act, the FSC Act and the FIAL Act. These 
requirements are discussed further.  
In terms of the Trusts Act, four types of trusts may be formed. Each type of trust has specific 
requirements for recording beneficiaries’ details. 
A general trust will be valid and enforceable only if a trust instrument is written.236 This trust 
instrument must contain the details of the beneficiaries.237 The beneficiaries of this type of 
trust must be identified by name or ascertainable by reference to a class of persons or by 
reference to a relationship between the beneficiary and some other identified person.238 
                                                            
236 Subsec 6(1)(b) of the Trusts Act. 
237 S 6 and subsec 12(2)(c) of the Trusts Act. 
238 Subsec 14(1) of the Trusts Act. 
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Protective trusts allow a beneficiary’s interest to be safeguarded in the event that the 
beneficiary’s assets may be seized to settle creditors’ claims.239 The trust instrument under 
which a protective trust is written, must contain details of the beneficiaries.240 
Beneficiaries may disclaim their interest, but such disclaimer must specify in writing the 
duration of the disclaimer or the circumstances under which the disclaimer is no longer 
effective.241 Until such time as the disclaimer in writing is delivered to a trustee, a 
beneficiary’s rights remain undisturbed.242 
A valid and enforceable purpose trust may be formed, despite a lack of identified or 
ascertainable beneficiaries.243 The purpose trust must hold objects which are specific, 
reasonable and capable of fulfilment and which are not immoral, unlawful or contrary to 
public policy.244 The purposes of the trust must be applied by an appointed enforcer.245 These 
types of trusts may hold infinite purposes and do not require beneficiaries to be recorded. 
Therefore there is a real concern that persons benefitting from the activities of the purpose 
will not be identified. 
A charitable trust may be established, if that trust holds the exclusive purpose of charitable 
activities for the benefit of the general public. These activities are deemed to include the 
relief of poverty, the advancement of religion and education, the protection of the 
environment and the advancement of human rights.246As the exclusive purpose of these trusts 
is to benefit the general public, charitable trusts would not be used to conceal the identities of 
its beneficiaries and creators. 
Mauritian tax resident trusts which make distributions must submit a declaration to the MRA 
by 31 March of the year in which the trust’s income tax year ends. This declaration would 
require the full name of each beneficiary and the amount distributed to the beneficiary.247 
All GBL1 trusts must be managed and controlled from Mauritius.248 In order to enjoy the 
benefits of double tax agreements concluded by Mauritius, the GBL1 trust must be tax 
                                                            
239 S 18 of the Trusts Act. 
240 S 6 and subsec 12(2)(c) of the Trusts Act. 
241 Subsec 16(2) of the Trusts Act. 
242 Subsec 16(3) of the Trusts Act. 
243 Subsec 12(2)(c) of the Trusts Act. 
244 Subsec 19(2)(a) of the Trusts Act. 
245 Subsec 19(2)(b) of the Trusts Act. 
246 Subsec 20(1) of the Trusts Act.  
247 Subsec 119(1)(a) of the Mauritian Income Tax Act. 
248 Refer to 3.2.2. 
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resident in Mauritius. Furthermore, at least one qualified trustee must be appointed. A 
qualified trustee must be a management company registered by the FSC or some other 
Mauritian resident person authorised by the FSC to provide trusteeship services.249 In practice 
the majority of qualified trustees are registered management companies.250 
It is highly likely that GBL1 trusts will be tax resident in Mauritius as these trusts will by 
necessity be administered in Mauritius with a majority of Mauritian resident trustees.251 
Therefore beneficiaries’ details must be submitted to the MRA when GBL1 trusts make 
distributions. 
Usually at least one trustee will be a management company licenced by the FSC. 
Furthermore, applications to be licenced with the FSC must be conducted through a licenced 
management company.252 
As discussed in chapter 3.4.1.1, management companies are required to comply with the 
Code and must therefore perform customer due diligence in line with this Code throughout 
their performance of an engagement. 
The Code, requires management companies to verify the legal trust arrangement and identify 
the principals of the arrangement. In order to do so, the management company must take 
reasonable steps to understand the ownership and control structure of the trust, verify and 
establish the existence of the trust and determine the identities of the principals of the trust. 
The principals of the trust include the settlors or contributors (even if these are unnamed), the 
trustees, the beneficiaries, the protectors and the enforcers of the trust.253 
The following guideline is given to achieve this verification and identification process:254 
• “Obtaining an original or appropriately certified copy of the trust deed or pertinent 
extracts thereof;” 
• “Where the trust is registered – checking with the relevant registry to ensure that the 
trust does exist;” 
• “Obtaining details of the registered office and place of business of the trustee;” 
                                                            
249 Subsec 28(1) read with s 1 of the Trusts Act. 
250 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:31) 
251 In terms of the definition of resident in s 73 of the Mauritian Income Tax Act, a trust is resident in Mauritius 
where the trust is administered from Mauritius and a majority of the trustees are resident in Mauritius. 
252 Subsec 72(1)(a) of the Financial Services Act. 
253 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:27-28). 
254 Ibid at 28. 
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• “Verifying the identity of the principals of the trustee” through measures prescribed 
for natural persons or legal persons, depending on the legal nature of the trustee. 
These due diligence procedures require the management company to identify the trustee and 
the beneficiaries of the trust. Furthermore where the principal is a legal person, the 
management company must drill down to identify and verify the individuals who are in 
control of that legal person.255 
Information to be collected for the individuals is discussed in chapter 3.4.1.1.256 
3.4.2.2 Measures to accurately record ownership information of Mauritian and foreign 
trusts 
A beneficiary’s interest may, subject to the terms of the trust, be transferred to another person 
through any means, including a sale or a pledge.257 Whilst there is a requirement to include 
the beneficiaries’ details in the trust instrument, there does not appear to be any requirement 
to record a transfer of a beneficiary’s interest. It is therefore possible for a beneficiary to sell 
his or her interest in a trust to another person, without this change being recorded in the trust 
instrument or being recorded by the trustees. 
Where distributions have not occurred or have occurred since the beneficiaries have changed, 
their details may not be recorded by the MRA or the records held by the MRA may not be 
current. Therefore the MRA may not always have reliable records of the beneficiaries of 
GBL1 trusts. 
Depending on the assessed risk, management companies must continue to perform customer 
due diligence procedures throughout the business relationship.258 Management companies are 
also required to maintain transactional records for at least seven years. These transactional 
records would include the name and address of the customer; the beneficial owner and the 
underlying principal; any instructions received; the destination of funds; the forms of 
authority; the nature of the transactions; and sale and purchase agreements.259 In maintaining 
these transactional records, the management company is well placed to identify changes in 
the identity of the beneficial owner of these trusts. 
                                                            
255 Ibid at 26. 
256 Ibid at 24-25. 
257 S 17 of the Trusts Act. 
258 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:34).  
259 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:51). 
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3.4.2.3 Enforcement of requirements to record and maintain ownership information 
As in the case of GBL1 companies, enforcement of measures to obtain and maintain 
beneficial ownership information for GBL1 trusts rests solely with the FSC. In terms of the 
Financial Services Act, punitive measures are in place and appear to be enforced to 
discourage non-compliance.260 
The existence and implementation of enforcement measures would greatly assist in 
preventing the use of GBL1 trusts to hide the identities of beneficial owners. 
3.4.2.4 Conclusion as to whether details of beneficiaries are recorded and maintained for 
GBL1 trusts 
Whilst all trust instruments, other than a trust instrument for a purpose trust, will require 
beneficiaries to be disclosed in the trust instrument, there appears to be an opportunity for 
beneficiaries to sell their interest to a new beneficiary without the new beneficiary’s details 
being recorded. 
In the case of a purpose trust, the beneficiaries’ details are not recorded. A multitude of 
persons could benefit from the decision of an enforcer if that enforcer believes that a 
distribution to these persons fulfils the purpose of the trust. 
The record of distributions available to the MRA may be historic, if distributions have not 
been made in recent periods or may be non-existent where distributions have not been made 
at all. 
Measures imposed on management companies to record the details of the trustees, settlors, 
enforcers and beneficiaries of trusts create a means for obtaining the details of beneficial 
owners of trusts. The obligations imposed on management companies to record and report 
changes in the principals of GBL1 trusts also create a means to maintain the details of the 
beneficial owners of GBL1 trusts.  
Punitive measures which are applied by the FSC discourage non-compliance with the 
Financial Services Act by licensees, including management companies. Recent history 
indicates that the FSC enforces these punitive measures.   
The Global Business Licence regime is largely reliant on service providers (i.e. licensed 
management companies) to acquire and maintain information regarding the beneficial 
                                                            
260 Refer to chapter 3.4.1.3 for further information as to the enforcement measures implemented by the FSC. 
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ownership of GBL1 trusts. Whether this is an appropriate means for obtaining ownership 
information is discussed further in chapter 3.4.6. 
3.4.3 Obtaining and maintaining information for Mauritian and foreign foundations 
Foundations ordinarily face less regulation and supervision from authorities, increasing the 
opportunity for beneficial owners to go unrecorded. Nominee founders may also be used to 
conceal the identities of founders and beneficiaries. Measures undertaken to obtain and 
maintain information of beneficial ownership of GBL1 foundations is considered further.  
3.4.3.1 Measures to accurately record beneficial ownership information of GBL1 
Mauritian and foreign foundations 
Both Mauritian and foreign foundations lack separate legal capacity until the foundation has 
registered with the Registrar of Companies in Mauritius.261 
In order to register, the foundation must submit a charter of foundation to the Registrar of 
Companies.262 This charter requires the following relevant details to be documented:263 
• The founder’s name and address. 
• Where the founder is a body corporate, the legal name and registered address and 
particulars of its directors and controlling members. 
• The beneficiary must be named or the manner in which to appoint or remove a 
beneficiary must be specified. 
• The name and address of the secretary. 
• The procedure to be followed to appoint the Council or a protector. 
• The address of the registered office for the foundation. 
This charter of foundation specifies the beneficiaries or specifies the means for identifying 
beneficiaries who may be appointed. Furthermore the charter clearly states the founder’s 
name and address. The beneficial owners of a foundation can be determined from the charter 
of foundation. 
The charter of foundation, minutes of Council meetings and the name and address of the 
founder and members of the Council must be kept at the registered office.264 Therefore the 
record of the beneficial owners of a foundation is recorded and available. 
                                                            
261 S 5 read with s 24 of the Foundations Act. 
262 Subsec 23(1)(b) of the Foundations Act. 
263 Subsec 8(1) of the Foundations Act.  
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In applying for a GBL1 licence, the foundation must complete registration through a licensed 
management company265 in accordance with the Financial Services Rules of 2008. As 
previously elaborated in chapters 3.4.1.1 and 3.4.2.1, management companies are therefore 
obliged to perform customer due diligence procedures for foundations wishing to obtain a 
GBL1 licence. The guideline procedures are specified in the Code. The Code does not 
specifically identify the customer due diligence information to be kept for a foundation. 
However, the Code is a guide to assist management companies to comply with the FIAL Act 
and therefore the management company must still perform sufficient procedures. 
In terms of the principles of the Code, management companies must verify the existence and 
must identify the principals of the foundation. In order to do so, the management company 
must take reasonable steps to understand the ownership and control structure of the 
foundation, verify and establish the existence of the foundation and determine the identities 
of the principals of the foundation. Essentially, the principals include the founder, the 
beneficiaries and ultimate beneficiaries and the Council members of the foundation.   
These due diligence procedures would require the management company to identify and 
verify the beneficial owners of the foundation and the ultimate beneficial owners of the 
foundation against original or certified copies of supporting documents such as its charter. 
Furthermore where the beneficial or ultimate beneficial owner is a legal person, the 
management company must drill down to identify and verify the individuals who are in 
control of that legal person.266  Information to be collected for the individuals is discussed in 
chapter 3.4.1.1.267 
3.4.3.2 Measures to maintain ownership information for GBL1 Mauritian and foreign 
foundations 
The charter of foundation must contain the details of all beneficiaries. Where a beneficiary is 
added or removed, the charter must be amended. The Registrar of Companies in Mauritius 
must be notified of amendments made to the charter and must update the foundation register 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
264 Subsec 37(1) of the Foundations Act. 
265 Subsec 72(1)(a) of the FSC Act. 
266 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:26). 
267 Ibid at 24-25. 
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accordingly.268 Therefore a means exists to maintain changes in the details of beneficiaries of 
foundations. 
For every foundation, a secretary must be appointed. The secretary must be a management 
company licenced with the FSC or another person authorised by the FSC to act as a 
secretary.269 
Where a management company acts as the secretary for a foundation, the management 
company must continue to perform customer due diligence procedures.270 These management 
companies are also required to maintain transactional records for at least seven years. These 
transactional records include the name and address of the customer, the beneficial owner and 
the underlying principal, any instructions received and the destination of the foundation’s 
funds.271 In maintaining these transactional records, the management company is well placed 
to identify changes in the beneficial owner of these foundations. 
3.4.3.3 Enforcement of requirements to record and maintain ownership information 
As in the case of GBL1 companies, enforcement of measures to obtain and maintain 
beneficial ownership information for GBL1 foundations rests solely with the FSC. In terms of 
the Financial Services Act, punitive measures are in place and appear to be enforced to 
discourage non-compliance.272 
The existence and implementation of enforcement measures would greatly encourage 
compliance in keeping the details of the beneficial owners of these foundations. 
3.4.3.4 Conclusion as to the recording and maintenance of ownership information for 
GBL1 foundations 
Measures exist under the Foundations Act to record and maintain the records of the 
beneficiaries, founders and Council members of foundations. 
Recording and the maintaining the beneficial owners’ details of GBL1 foundations is further 
reinforced through anti-money laundering codes imposed on management companies during 
the global business licencing process and when they act as secretaries for the foundation. 
                                                            
268 Subsec 9(2) and subsec 9(4) of the Foundations Act. 
269 Subsec 13(1) of the Foundations Act. 
270 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:34).  
271 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:51). 
272 Refer to chapter 3.4.1.3 for further information as to the enforcement measures implemented by the FSC. 
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Measures are in place requiring the legal and beneficial owners of these foundations to be 
recorded and updated. These measures are reinforced through punitive actions undertaken by 
the FSC where management companies and GBL1 foundations do not comply with the 
Financial Services Act and where foundations are abused. Recent FSC practice of carrying 
out punitive actions should discourage those who wish to hide the details of beneficial owners 
through circumventing the Financial Services Act and or through not conducting sufficient 
customer due diligence. 
The Global Business Licence regime is largely reliant on service providers (i.e. licensed 
management companies) to acquire and maintain information regarding the beneficial 
ownership of the licenced corporations. Whether this is an appropriate means for obtaining 
ownership information is discussed further in chapter 3.4.6. 
3.4.4 Obtaining and maintaining information for local and foreign limited liability 
partnerships 
Where authorities do not require the identity of a limited liability partner to be registered, this 
person’s identity can be concealed. Furthermore, the limited partner can appoint a nominee 
partner to cloak the fact that the limited partner is in de facto control of the limited liability 
partnership. 
Measures undertaken by the Mauritian Legislature and authorities to obtain and maintain 
beneficial ownership information of GBL1 registered limited liability partnerships is 
considered further.  
3.4.4.1 Measures to accurately record beneficial ownership information of GBL1 limited 
liability partnerships 
 A société en commandite simple, is registered once the following documentation is submitted 
to the Registrar of Companies in Mauritius:273 
• The name of the partnership. 
• The full name, address and designation of the partners who are authorised to manage, 
administer and sign on behalf of the partnership. 
• The partnership contribution of each partner. 
                                                            
273 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:27-28). 
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Article 48 of the Code de Commerce requires that partnership deeds contain the full 
information of each partner.274 
The beneficial ownership of an interest in a société en commandite simple is not required to 
be disclosed to the Registrar of Companies with the result that beneficial ownership of these 
partnerships can be concealed if the partner is a nominee partner.275 
A limited partnership, which is not a société en commandite simple, may elect to be 
registered as a legal person. The general partners must register the limited partnership with 
the Registrar of Companies of Mauritius to secure the separate legal identity of the limited 
partnership.276 The information to be provided to the Registrar of Companies must contain 
such information as is required.277 For all registered limited partnerships, the Registrar of 
Companies must keep a register containing the details of all of the partners. An individual 
partner’s full name, the assignee’s full name and their addresses must be included in the 
register. For partners who are not individuals, the name and the registered office address or 
place of business must be included in the register.278 Therefore information regarding the 
registered general and limited partners will be placed on record. However no information is 
required to be disclosed where a partner is acting as a nominee. 
Both a société en commandite simple and a limited partnership must be registered in order to 
be licensed as a GBL1 corporation. Unless other measures exist, a nominee partner may be 
used to conceal the identities of the partners of a société en commandite simple and a limited 
partnership. 
Where a limited partnership does not have at least one general partner who is resident in 
Mauritius or who is domiciled in Mauritius, a registered agent must be appointed.279 In the 
case of a GBL1 limited partnership, this registered agent may be a management company 
licensed by the FSC.280 Furthermore, any limited partnership or a société en commandite 
                                                            
274 Ibid at 28. 
275 Ibid. 
276 Subsec 11(1) – 11(2)(a) of the Partnership Act. 
277 Subsec 19(2)(b) of the Partnerships Act. 
278 Subsec 21(3)(c)-(d) of the Partnerships Act. 
279 Subsec 12(6) of the Partnerships Act. 
280 S 2 of the Partnerships Act – refer to the definition of “registered agent”. 
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simple wishing to be licensed as a GBL1 corporation must use the services of a licensed 
management company to submit the application to the FSC.281 
In terms of the Code a management company is required to perform due diligence procedures 
on its clients.282 A management company submitting a GBL1 application for a société en 
commandite simple or a limited partnership or which acts as a registered agent for a limited 
partnership must identify the beneficial owners of the partnership.283 
The Code requires that the management company verify the existence of the principals of a 
société en commandite simple. To comply with this requirement, the société partnership 
agreement (the acte de société) must be kept and all of the partners’ identities must be 
verified.284 
The existence of all of the principals of a limited partnership must be verified by the 
management company that provides services to that limited partnership. The identities of 
both general and limited partners must also be verified. As support for the GBL1 application, 
the partnership agreement and the customer due diligence documentation collected for the 
general partners and limited partners, whose interest is 20% or more of the partnership, must 
be submitted to the FSC.285 
Where the partner of a société en commandite simple or a limited partnership is an individual, 
the information required for that individual is discussed in chapter 3.4.1.1.286 
Where the partner is a legal person, the management company must perform further 
investigations to identify the individuals or other persons who ultimately control the société 
en commandite simple or limited partnership.287 
                                                            
281 Subsec 72(1)(a) of the Financial Services Act. 
282 Refer to chapter 3.4.1.1 for further detail as to why such customer due diligence must be performed by 
management companies. 
283 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:23). 
284 Ibid at 27. 
285 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius. 2012. Circular Letter CL 200112: Limited Partnerships – 
Application for a Global Business Licence. Available: 
http://www.fscmauritius.org/media/65582/cl200112.pdf  [10 November 2013] 
286 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:24-25). 
287 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:26). 
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3.4.4.2 Measures to maintain ownership information for GBL1 limited liability 
partnerships 
A change in the partners of a registered limited partnership does not affect the legal existence 
of the limited partnership.288 
A limited partnership, may require a management company to act as its registered agent. 
Where a management company acts as the registered agent for a limited partnership, 
customer due diligence procedures must be performed.289 These management companies are 
required to maintain transactional records for at least seven years. These transactional records 
would include the name and address of the customer, the beneficial owner and the underlying 
principal, any instructions received and the destination of the limited partnership’s funds.290 
In maintaining these transactional records, the management company is best placed to 
identify changes in the identity of the beneficial owner of these limited partnerships. 
3.4.4.3 Enforcement of requirements to record and maintain ownership information 
As in the case of GBL1 companies, enforcement of measures to obtain and maintain 
beneficial ownership information for GBL1 limited liability partnerships rests solely with the 
FSC. In terms of the Financial Services Act, punitive measures are in place and appear to be 
enforced to discourage non-compliance.291 
The existence and implementation of enforcement measures would greatly assist in 
preventing GBL1 limited liability partnerships from being used to hide the identities of its 
beneficial owners. 
3.4.4.4 Conclusion as to the recording and maintenance of ownership information for 
GBL1 limited liability partnerships 
Both limited partnerships and société en commandite simple require the details of the general 
and limited partners to be registered with the Registrar of Companies in Mauritius. 
The risk resulting from the concealing of the identities of the beneficial owners of both forms 
of limited liability partnerships can be increased through using nominee general partners or 
where the partners are foreign persons. However, thorough customer due diligence 
                                                            
288 Subsec 11(3) of the Partnerships Act. 
289 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:34).  
290 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:51). 
291 Refer to chapter 3.4.1.3 for further information as to the enforcement measures implemented by the FSC. 
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procedures performed by a management company should be sufficient to uncover the 
identities of all of the partners, including those who are foreign. Furthermore, these 
procedures would require the beneficial owners’ details to be verified where a partner is a 
legal person or a legal arrangement, such as a trust. 
Incentives to ensure diligent recording of the detail of the beneficial partners of limited 
liability partnerships licensed to conduct global business, would be strengthened through 
punitive measures imposed by the FSC on those that fail to comply with measures aimed at 
providing a means to identify these partners. 
The identification of beneficial owners of both limited partnerships and société en 
commandite simple is largely dependent on the work of management companies. Whether 
this is an appropriate means for obtaining information on the beneficial owners is discussed 
further in chapter 3.4.6. 
3.4.5 Obtaining beneficial ownership information where nominee shareholders are 
registered for GBL1 and GBL2 companies 
Nominee shareholders can effectively hide the details of the beneficial shareholders of a 
GBL1 and GBL2 company, unless there is legislative means to require a nominee shareholder 
to disclose the identity of the persons they acting for. 
The Mauritian Registrar of Companies does not ascertain the identities behind nominee 
shareholdings.292 
Whilst nominee shareholders are not required to disclose upfront who they are acting for, 
management companies are obliged to probe arrangements where it is known or ought to be 
known that a nominee arrangement is being utilised. Where this information is not provided 
or where the appropriate investigations are not performed by the management company, the 
FSC will refuse the global business licence application.293 
Management companies which are found to be deliberately collaborating in concealing a 
nominee arrangement will be subject to disciplinary action.294 The enforcement of these 
punitive actions in recent history may serve to discourage nominee shareholders and 
                                                            
292 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011: 18 and 33). 
293 Ibid at 25. 
294 Ibid. 
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management companies from utilising nominee arrangements to hide the identities of 
beneficial owners.295 
Once again the responsibility for determining the beneficial owner of companies rests with 
management companies and the FSC. Whether it is appropriate to obtain information on these 
beneficial owners through the agency of service providers is discussed further in chapter 
3.4.6. 
3.4.6 Means employed by Mauritius as an effective manner for gathering ownership 
information 
Customer due diligence requirements imposed on management companies is the primary 
means to identify the beneficial owners of GBL1 and GBL2 corporations. Ideally, if the legal 
system and professional environment is suitable and requisite elements apply, it may be 
possible to rely on service providers to record and maintain accurate details of beneficial 
owners and to share such information timeously with authorities. 
Whether the Mauritian legal system and professional environment promotes the sharing of 
beneficial ownership information for GBL1 and GBL2 corporations is examined further. 
3.4.6.1 Compulsory powers and institutional capacity to monitor compliance by 
management companies 
A system relying on service providers to obtain ownership information must empower the 
fiscal authorities to coerce service providers to comply with their investigative, recording, 
maintenance and reporting obligations. Furthermore, the empowered authority must have the 
capacity to fulfil a compliance monitoring function.296 
A management company is obliged to provide the information, records and documents 
requested by the FSC in order for it to exercise its functions mandated under legislation.297 
These functions include ensuring that management companies comply with the FIAL Act.298 
Therefore the FSC has the power to request that management companies provide any 
customer due diligence information, records and documents it considers necessary to ensure 
that management companies are collecting and maintaining information in respect of 
beneficial owners. 
                                                            
295 Refer to chapter 3.4.1.3 for further information as to the enforcement measures implemented by the FSC. 
296 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001:82) 
297 Subsec 42(1) and subsec 42(2) of the Financial Services Act. 
298 Subsec 18(1)(c) of the FIAL Act. 
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The FSC may further conduct on-site inspections and audits at the premises of the 
management company, with the aim of assessing the degree of compliance of the company 
with applicable legislation and guidelines.299 
The FSC’s licensing and surveillance departments has a professional staff complement, 
which includes lawyers, accountants and economists who are responsible for monitoring 
compliance.300 
For each GBL1 application, a management company must submit certified copies of the 
customer due diligence documentation, the incorporation documentation and the constitution 
of the corporation applying for that licence.301 This documentation would be submitted on 
request in the case of a GBL2 application.302 As a result, the FSC can use the global business 
licence application process to monitor the quality of customer due diligence documentation 
kept by management companies. 
Depending on the complexity of the corporate structure of the applicant, a GBL2 licence 
application will be completed within one to two days, whilst a GBL1 licence application will 
be completed in three to seven days.303 This short turnaround time indicates that the FSC has 
the capacity to supervise and monitor that management companies are up to speed with 
regards to customer due diligence for global business licence applications. 
In conclusion, the Mauritian legislation provides an absolute means for the FSC to ensure that 
management companies are maintaining the required customer due diligence documentation. 
Furthermore, the FSC departments monitoring this compliance are equipped with suitably 
qualified professionals who have the capacity to perform quality reviews of customer due 
diligence documentation submitted. 
3.4.6.2 Pool of service providers to possess suitable skills, experience and capacity 
To ensure the quality of records maintained for beneficial owners, it is essential that service 
providers possess staff with the necessary experience and qualifications and that these service 
providers have sufficient resources.304 
                                                            
299 Subsec 43(1) of the Financial Services Act. 
300 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:33). 
301 Financial Services (Consolidated Licensing and Fees) Rules 2008. Rules 12(1)(d)-(e).  
302 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2010:2). 
303 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:33). 
304 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001:82). 
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3.4.6.2.1 Experience and qualifications of persons in control of management companies 
Persons in control of management companies have to set the standards required to monitor 
compliance with internal controls, procedures and policies necessary to maintain the quality 
of customer due diligence reporting performed by staff.305 Therefore it is essential that these 
persons possess suitable skills and experience to implement and monitor these measures. 
Persons applying for a management company licence must comply with the same licensing 
regulations as persons providing financial services under the Financial Services Act.306 A 
licence to practice as a management company will therefore not be granted unless the 
applicant can satisfy the FSC that the persons who are the beneficial owners and who are in 
control of the management company are fit and proper to control its activities.307 
In evaluating whether these persons are fit and proper, the FSC will consider if they have 
“relevant education, qualifications and experience”, the “ability to perform the relevant 
functions properly, efficiently, honestly and fairly” and a fit “reputation, character, financial 
integrity and reliability”.308 
A Personal Questionnaire must be completed for the FSC to gauge whether the individual is 
fit and proper to control the management company applying for the licence. The information 
to be declared by these persons includes:309 
• Listing current affiliations and memberships of professional bodies and the year that 
admission was granted. 
• Details of other relevant skills and qualifications. 
• Listing any positions held at other institutions providing financial services. 
• Particulars of any convictions by a court of law. 
• Particulars of any cases where the individual has personally been subject to punitive 
action, been refused a licence to perform activities, had a licence to perform activities 
revoked, been censured or publicly criticised or been subject to an investigation. 
• Declaring particulars of any cases where a financial services entity, which the 
individual is associated with,310 has been subject to punitive action, has been refused 
                                                            
305 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:47). 
306 Subsec 77(2) of the Financial Services Act. 
307 Subsec 18(2)(c), subsec 18(2)(d) and subsec 18(2)(e) of the Financial Services Act. 
308 Subsec 20(1)(a) of the Financial Services Act. 
309 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius. Personal Questionnaire. Available: 
http://www.fscmauritius.org/media/52782/personal questionnaire.pdf [16 November 2013] 
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a licence to perform activities, has had a licence to perform activities revoked, has 
been censured or publicly criticised or has been subject to an investigation. 
• Declaring cases where the individual has been declared bankrupt or has entered into 
compromises with his or her creditors. 
• Declaring cases where the individual is associated with a financial service entity and 
that financial service entity has been compulsorily wound up, has entered into a 
compromise with its creditors or has ceased trading. 
• Declaring cases where the individual is personally engaged in disputes arising from 
the management of any business entity. 
• Declaring cases where the individual has in the past 7 years been subject to any 
financial services, regulatory supervision.   
The professional affiliations, skills, competence and experience declared by these individuals 
can be verified by the FSC contacting references named in the declaration. 
Any person who is found to have made a false declaration or who omits intentionally an item 
from the Personal Questionnaire, will be liable to a fine up to 500 000 rupees and to 
imprisonment not exceeding 5 years.311 
3.4.6.2.2 Skills and knowledge of persons performing customer due diligence activities of 
management companies 
Key to the customer due diligence process of management companies is the employment of 
alert competent staff. Therefore management companies must ensure that their staff 
performing customer due diligence procedures are sufficiently skilled and knowledgeable.312 
To this end management companies are required to screen staff to ensure that they are 
competent and of high integrity. Staff screening processes includes requesting and confirming 
references, verifying employment history and staff qualifications, obtaining details of any 
disciplinary action taken by previous employers or professional bodies and checking and 
verifying the details of criminal convictions.313 
Initial and ongoing training of staff is expected of management companies. This training 
covers maintaining customer due diligence documentation and the legal ramifications of 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
310 An individual is associated to an entity if he or she acted as a director, secretary, controller, officer, a senior 
member of staff or as a controlling shareholder of that entity. 
311 Subsec 19(2) of the Financial Services Act. 
312 Financial Services Commission of Mauritius (2012:46). 
313 Ibid at 47. 
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failing to maintain these records. Training is expected to be conducted annually, except 
where staff handle business transactions and relationships, in which case the training should 
be undertaken more often.314 
3.4.6.2.3 Resources employed by management companies 
The reputation of Mauritius as an international financial services centre is largely dependent 
on the quality of the services on offer. Therefore it is essential that management companies 
employ sufficient resources to meet the requirements of clients and the FSC. 
As at 31 December 2011, there were 158 licensed management companies, which included 
management companies providing only corporate trustee services. These management 
companies employed 2 629 staff.315 At this time, management companies administered 9 758 
GBL1 corporations and acted as registered agents for 14 166 GBL2 corporations.316 That 
translates on average to each management company servicing 152 GBL corporations. 
Furthermore by the end of 2011, each employee of a management company serviced 
approximately 9 GBL corporations. 
By the end of August 2013, 10 772 GBL1 corporations and 15 324 GBL2 corporations are 
being serviced by 169 management companies or on average 154 corporations are serviced 
per management company.317 
3.4.6.2.4 Conclusion as to whether management companies possess suitable skills, 
experience and capacity 
Details provided in Personal Questionnaires completed by individuals in control of 
management companies seeking licences should greatly assist the FSC in granting 
management licences to persons with the requisite skills, competence and experience and 
honesty. Credibility is reinforced by the applicants implicit understanding that the 
questionnaires will be verified thoroughly and there is a very real threat of severe punitive 
action for false declarations and deliberate omissions of detail.  
                                                            
314 Ibid at 47 - 48. 
315 Financial Services Commission, Mauritius. 2012. Annual Statistical Bulletin 2012. Available: 
http://www.fscmauritius.org/media/81458/fscstatsbulletin2012.pdf - at 17 [15 November 2013] 
316 Financial Services Commission, Mauritius. Global Business Data Sheet – Monthly Evolution - 2011. 
Available: http://www.fscmauritius.org/media/67043/final_gb_2011.xlsx [16 November 2013] 
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The day-to-day due diligence procedures of management companies are conducted by staff 
who are adequately screened for competence and integrity. Furthermore, management 
companies must provide training to ensure that their staff  remain up to speed in customer due 
diligence procedures.   
By reasoning, the average number of GBL corporations serviced by each staff member of 
management companies is sufficiently low to indicate that adequate resources are available to 
service GBL corporations. Furthermore, the ratio of management companies to GBL 
corporations consistently indicates that there are sufficient management companies to service 
GBL corporations. The official statistics of the number GBL corporations and the number of 
management companies reflects a sufficiently low ratio both of management companies and 
staff for the efficient servicing of the corporations.  
3.4.6.3 Important elements that must be present to ensure that management companies 
can collect beneficial owners’ details 
Important elements must exist to allow beneficial ownership information to be collected by 
management companies.318 The advised elements are evaluated further. 
3.4.6.3.1 Documentation collected and maintained by management companies 
Management companies must collect and maintain information on the persons in control of 
and who ultimately benefit from the activities of a GBL corporation. 
In determining the ultimate beneficial owner of these corporations and in determining the 
persons in control of these corporations, the management company must identify the 
individuals behind any legal persons or legal arrangements who are the registered owners of 
GBL corporations.319 
The individuals who have provided funds to a trust or to a foundation must be identified. 
Furthermore, the beneficiaries, trustees, protectors and members of the Council of a trust or 
foundation must also be identified by the management company.320 
The identities of both general and limited partners must be obtained in the case of a GBL1 
partnership. Where a partner of a GBL1 partnership is a legal person, the ultimate beneficial 
owner of that corporate person must be identified.321 
                                                            
318 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001:82). 
319 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001:79). 
320 Ibid at 79 - 80. 
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The beneficial ownership of these GBL corporations must be updated on a timely basis.322 
It is submitted that the customer due diligence procedures performed by management 
companies for global business licensed companies, trusts, foundations and partnerships 
ensures that management companies collect and maintain the identities of the beneficial 
owners of these entities.323 
3.4.6.3.2 Licensing regime for management companies 
A licensing regime for service providers is essential when information on beneficial owners 
is to be gathered from service providers. Under a licencing regime only competent service 
providers may be able to offer the services of corporation formations and the provision of 
management services. Under this regime, authorities are able to establish appropriate 
standards, codes of best practice and are able to supervise compliance.324 
Persons performing administrative, management, nominee, corporate trustee and other 
services to global business corporations must be licenced by the FSC.325 All applications for a 
global business licence from the FSC must be submitted via a management company.326 
Every GBL1 corporation must be administered by a management company327 and every 
GBL2 corporation must appoint a management company to act as its registered agent.328 
Therefore the Mauritian global business licencing regime is administered by persons 
considered competent by the FSC.  
As management companies must be licenced, the FSC has the power to regulate all activities 
of the management companies through, inter alia, setting rules, issuing guidelines, setting 
standards, issuing instructions to comply with relevant acts or guidelines and instituting 
punitive measures against non-compliant management companies.329 In particular, 
management companies are required to comply with the Code in respect of keeping 
prescribed customer due diligence documentation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
321 Ibid. 
322 Ibid. 
323 For further discussion on the information collected for these GBL corporations refer to chapters 3.4.1.1, 
3.4.2.1, 3.4.3.1, 3.4.4.1 and 3.4.5.  
324 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001:83). 
325 Subsec 77(1) of the Financial Services Act. 
326 Subsec 72(1)(a) of the Financial Services Act. 
327 Subsec 71(5) of the Financial Services Act. 
328 Subsec 76(1) of the Financial Services Act. 
329 S 7(1) of the Financial Services Act. 
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For the aforementioned reasons, a robust licensing regime for management companies is in 
place. 
3.4.6.3.3 Sanctions must be imposed on service providers in cases of non-compliance  
To discourage service providers from not fulfilling their obligations, sufficient sanctions for 
non-compliance must be imposed.330 
As discussed in chapter 3.4.1.3, the FSC may take disciplinary action against management 
companies and officers of management companies for failing to comply with the Financial 
Services Act and therefore this element is present.  
3.4.6.3.4 Access to ownership information kept by service providers 
Regardless of which authority requests information kept by service providers, this 
information must be provided.331 
As a general rule management companies cannot divulge information or provide 
documentation in its possession relating to a corporation holding a global business licence.332 
However, this information and documentation must be provided to the FSC333 and to the 
Financial Intelligence Unit.334  Furthermore where the MRA requires information from a 
management company for the purposes of enabling the MRA to respond to a request for 
information under a double tax agreement, this information must be provided by the 
management company.335 
Whilst it has not been tested by Mauritian courts, indications are that officers of management 
companies would be compelled to supply the information requested by the FSC, the Financial 
Intelligence Unit and the MRA, despite any potential client secrecy privileges.336 
In conclusion information regarding the identities of beneficial owners of GBL corporations 
must be provided by a management company to Mauritian authorities. 
 
                                                            
330 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2001: 83). 
331 Ibid. 
332 Subsec 44(6) of the Financial Services Act. 
333 Subsec 42(1) of the Financial Services Act. 
334 Subsec 44(6) of the Financial Services Act. 
335 Subsec 44(6) of the Financial Services Act read with subsec 124(1)(b) of the Mauritian Income Tax Act. 
336 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011: 52). 
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3.4.6.4 Conclusion as to whether the use of management companies enables the effective 
collection of beneficial ownership information for GBL corporations  
The collection of beneficial ownership information for GBL corporations through 
management companies is suitable as management companies are subject to compulsory 
monitoring by the FSC, which appears to have the capacity to perform this function. 
Management companies are required by the FSC to be suitably skilled, experienced and must 
have sufficient capacity to efficiently record and maintain the beneficial ownership 
information of these corporations. 
The recommended key elements for management companies to effectively provide a basis for 
the collection of this information are also in place. 
It is therefore submitted, that the collection of beneficial ownership information for GBL1 
and GBL2 corporations is efficient and appropriate. 
3.5 The capability of Mauritian authorities to share ownership information with 
foreign jurisdictions 
Management companies cannot divulge information to foreign authorities.337 
No officer of the FSC may share beneficial ownership information relating to GBL 
corporations with any foreign authority338 unless this would prevent information being shared 
under an agreement with the government of that foreign authority.339 
Officers of the Financial Intelligence Unit would also only be permitted to share beneficial 
ownership information of GBL corporations to foreign tax authorities where it is required to 
do so to fulfil obligations under an international agreement.340 
To ensure that Mauritius is capable of exchanging ownership information for GBL1 and 
GBL2 corporations, it is necessary for Mauritius to have a sufficiently wide network of 
agreements specifically intended to provide a basis for sharing this information. Furthermore, 
Mauritian legislation should ensure that such agreements are effective and binding in law.341 
                                                            
337 Refer to chapter 3.4.6.3.4. 
338 Subsec 83(4) of the Financial Services Act. 
339 Subsec 83(7)(a) of the Financial Services Act. 
340 Subsec 30(2)(c) of the FIAL Act. 
341 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:59). 
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3.5.1 Effectiveness of Mauritian exchange of information agreements 
3.5.1.1 Effect of international information sharing agreements in Mauritian law 
The Finance Minister of Mauritius may conclude enforceable international agreements 
between Mauritius and foreign governments for the purpose of sharing information to assist 
with the administration of both Mauritian and foreign countries’ tax laws.342  
3.5.1.2 Agreements concluded permit the exchange of “foreseeably relevant” information 
Only the double tax agreements concluded with China and the United Kingdom considers the 
exchange of information which is “foreseeably relevant”. The remaining agreements require 
information which is necessary for carrying out the provisions of the agreement or of the 
domestic laws of the contracting states to be exchanged.343 
Despite the express absence of the “foreseeably relevant” term in the majority of its double 
tax agreements, Mauritian authorities do not appear to interpret the words “foreseeably 
relevant” and “necessary” differently. Double tax agreements concluded by Mauritius would 
permit, therefore, for information to be shared, in line with the standard of “foreseeable 
relevance”.344 
Mauritian authorities are generous when considering requests for information. Ordinarily 
requested information would be supplied without inquiring further whether it is actually 
required for the purposes set out in the relevant agreement. The MRA has not denied a 
request for information, on the grounds that the information is not “foreseeably relevant”.345 
3.5.1.3 Mauritian authority's ability to share ownership information under international 
tax agreements   
The laws of Mauritius must permit authorities to lift any confidentiality or secrecy provisions 
for the purpose of sharing “foreseeably relevant” information under the auspices of a double 
tax agreement. Confidentiality and secrecy considerations applicable to professionals, such as 
service providers, must also not prevent these persons from divulging information to 
Mauritian authorities or provide them a loophole for declining to do so. 
                                                            
342 S 76 of the Mauritian Income Tax Act and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(2011:70). 
343 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:62). 
344 Ibid. 
345 Ibid at 63. 
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Management companies must provide revenue authorities with information required to 
answer requests stemming from a double tax agreement.346  
The MRA is not prevented from disclosing information requested under a double tax 
agreement for secrecy reasons.347 
Therefore, where a double tax agreement is in force, confidentiality and secrecy laws of 
Mauritius do not prevent ownership information of GBL corporations being gathered from 
management companies by the MRA and these laws also do not prevent that information 
from being provided to foreign authorities by the MRA. 
3.5.1.4 No domestic tax interest requirement for exchange of information 
Where a double tax agreement does not explicitly require a state to obtain and supply this 
information on the basis that the information is not required for the enforcement of its tax 
laws, there is a real concern that the ownership information of GBL corporations will not be 
shared. 
Only the double tax agreements concluded with China and the United Kingdom obliges 
Mauritius to share information despite it not requiring that information for the purposes of 
enforcing its own tax laws.348 However, as all information requested of persons, in order to 
comply with a request from a treaty partner, must be provided,349 the absence of this express 
requirement in the other double tax agreements concluded by Mauritius is not detrimental to 
the sharing of information with treaty partners.350 
3.5.2 Exchange of ownership information with all relevant partners 
Ownership information of GBL corporations should be capable of being shared with all 
relevant partners.351 
Mauritius has concluded 46 double tax agreements.352 These include agreements with a 
number of its main trading partners and in particular with significant trading partners 
contributing foreign direct investment. Mauritius has also concluded eight tax information 
                                                            
346 Refer to chapter 3.4.6.3.4. 
347 Subsec 76(5) of the Mauritian Income Tax Act. 
348 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:67).  
349 Subsec 124(1) of the Income Tax Act of Mauritius. 
350 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2011:68) 
351 Ibid at 72. 
352 8 of these agreements, namely with Bangladesh, Egypt, Gabon, Guernsey, Kenya, Nigeria, Republic of 
Congo and Russia are not yet in force – See Appendix C. 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
An investigation into whether the South African and 
Mauritian preferential holding company regimes may 




exchange agreements.353 It is also actively seeking to extend its double tax agreement 
network and continues to negotiate tax information exchange agreements.354 
As at 2011, Mauritius had never refused an exchange of information agreement request.355 
In conclusion Mauritius has a tax treaty network with most of its trading partners. This treaty 
network allows for exchange of information. However, development of this treaty network 
would further widen the sharing of beneficial owners' identities of GBL corporations to more 
countries.  
3.5.3 Conclusion as to whether ownership information of GBL corporations may be 
effectively shared 
Mauritius has and continues to conclude international agreements which provide for the 
exchange of information between states. These measures are incorporated into Mauritian law 
which permits information to be shared under these agreements.  
Mauritius must pursue further international agreements allowing the exchange of 
information. 
3.6 Conclusion – The Mauritian Global Business Licence regime as a transparent 
holding company regime 
The Global Business Licence regime allows the licencing of vehicles with features which 
promote the concealment of its beneficial owners. 
It is impossible for a corporation to be licenced and to maintain its licence if it does not 
obtain incorporation and management services from a management company which is 
licenced by the FSC. Management companies are obliged to keep and maintain customer due 
diligence documentation which will identify the beneficial owners of these corporations. 
Punitive action deters management companies and licensees from not maintaining ownership 
information for these corporations. 
 Management companies must have the required skills, competence, experience and capacity 
to offer services to GBL corporations. Compliance to standards for maintaining customer due 
diligence documentation is codified and enforced by the FSC.  Furthermore, the licencing and 
monitoring of the activities of management companies is performed by the FSC, which has 
                                                            
353 Refer to Appendix J for further details. 
354 Ibid at 72-73 and refer to Appendix K for treaties which Mauritius is in the process of negotiating. 
355 Ibid at 73. 
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the necessary capacity and enforcement powers. Therefore the integrity of this system for 
collecting and maintaining the identities of the beneficial owners of these corporations is 
fortified.  
Beneficial ownership information must be provided to the MRA by management companies 
for the purpose of providing information under a double tax agreement. Mauritius is able to 
share ownership information with treaty partners. Mauritius has only concluded 46 double tax  
agreements and eight tax information exchange agreements, thus limiting the effective scope 
of sharing widely beneficial ownership information which is pertinent to the administration of 
the tax laws of other states. In mitigation, Mauritius has however concluded double tax 
agreements with its main trading partners and has concluded or is in the process of 
concluding tax information exchange agreements with other states where a double tax 
agreement is absent. 
The Mauritian Government and the Mauritian authorities have made substantial efforts to 
ensure the transparency and credibility of the Global Business Licence regime. These efforts 
align with recommended international best practice so that these efforts should curb abusive 
concealment of the beneficial owners of GBL corporations. It is therefore submitted that the 
Global Business Licence regime does not undermine fiscal transparency. 
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4. Conclusion – the fiscal transparency of the South African and Mauritian 
preferential holding company regimes 
Investors are seeking a gateway into Africa in order to benefit from this continent’s largely 
untapped markets. The South African Headquarter Company and the Mauritian Global 
Business Licence regimes offer favourable holding company gateways into Africa. This 
dissertation set out to establish whether these two African holding company regimes have 
characteristics and installed measures to ensure the fiscal transparency so desired by the 
international community at large. The investigation evaluated the legal and administrative 
measures employed by South Africa and Mauritius to enforce the recording and maintenance 
of ownership information and the measures employed to collect and share this ownership 
information with foreign authorities.   
South Africa offers a Headquarter Company regime which permits the use of corporate 
entities and enables the use of nominee shareholdings which may aid in concealing owners’ 
identities.  
Measures are in place to enforce the accurate recording of the ownership of headquarter 
companies. This ownership information can be accessed through effectively established 
upfront disclosures and investigative means. Almost all of the double tax agreements and tax 
information exchange agreements concluded by South Africa allows for effective exchange 
of ownership information of headquarter companies with its treaty partners. Furthermore, 
South Africa remains committed to concluding protocols to existing agreements and to 
entering tax information exchange agreements to enable further exchange of ownership 
information for its headquarter companies. 
Ultimately, the South African Headquarter Company regime substantially prevents the 
concealment of owners’ details and therefore bears the imprint of a fiscally transparent 
holding company regime. 
The Mauritian Global Business Licence regime permits the licensing of entities which may 
aid in concealing owners’ identities.  
Customer due diligence measures performed by management companies are reinforced 
through prescribed best practices that are monitored and enforced by punitive measures 
employed by the FSC. These practices and measures meet standards of best practice and 
therefore it is submitted that the ownership information for GBL corporations is accurately 
maintained. Mauritian authorities are able to access and share ownership information 
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maintained by management companies. Mauritius has concluded double tax agreements with 
a number of its main trading partners, thereby largely facilitating the transfer of ownership 
information of these GBL corporations.  
Mauritian authorities have installed measures and continually make substantial efforts to 
align with recommended international best practice in curbing abusive concealment of the 
beneficial owners of GBL corporations. In conclusion, the Global Business Licence regime 
does not fundamentally undermine fiscal transparency. 
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Appendix A: Table of African Preferential Holding 
Company Regimes 
 
The below presents the preferential holding company regimes identified during the preparation of this 
dissertation. This table is prepared based on the Country Key Features for African states contained in 
the IBFD Tax Research Platform.  
 
African state Holding company regime 
offered? 
Applicable holding company 
regime 
Algeria No N/A 
Angola No N/A 
Benin No N/A 
Botswana Yes International Financial Service 
Centre regime offered. 
Burkina Faso No N/A 
Burundi No N/A 
Cameroon No N/A 
Cape Verde Yes International Business Centre 
regime offered. 
Central African Republic No N/A 
Chad No N/A 
Comoro Islands No N/A 
Congo (Democratic Republic of) No N/A 
Congo (Republic of) Yes General Tax Code Holding 
Company regime offered. 
Djibouti No N/A 
Egypt No N/A 
Equatorial Guinea No N/A 
Eritrea No N/A 
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African state Holding company regime 
offered? 
Applicable holding company 
regime 
Ethiopia No N/A 
Gabon No N/A 
Gambia No N/A 
Ghana No N/A 
Guinea No N/A 
Guinea-Bissau No N/A 
Ivory Coast No N/A 
Kenya No N/A 
Lesotho No N/A 
Liberia No N/A 
Libya No N/A 
Madagascar No N/A 
Malawi No N/A 
Mali No N/A 
Mauritania No N/A 
Mauritius Yes Global Business Licence 
regime offered. 
Morocco No N/A 
Mozambique No N/A 
Namibia No N/A 
Niger No N/A 
Nigeria No N/A 
Rwanda No N/A 
São Tomé and Príncipe No N/A 
Senegal No N/A 
Seychelles Yes International Business 
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African state Holding company regime 
offered? 
Applicable holding company 
regime 
Companies regime offered 
Sierra Leone No N/A 
South Africa Yes Headquarter Company regime 
offered 
South Sudan No N/A 
Sudan No N/A 
Swaziland No N/A 
Tanzania No N/A 
Togo No N/A 
Tunisia No N/A 
Uganda No N/A 
Zambia No N/A 
Zimbabwe No N/A 
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Appendix B: South Africa – double tax treaty 
network 
 
State African states Other states Not yet in force? 
Algeria  YES   
Australia   YES  
Austria  YES  
Belarus  YES  
Belgium  YES  
Botswana YES   
Brazil   YES  
Bulgaria  YES  
Canada   YES  
Chile  YES Not yet in force 
China (People’s 
Republic of)  
 YES  
Croatia   YES  
Cyprus   YES  
Czech Republic  YES  
Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
(DRC) 
YES   
Denmark  YES  
Egypt  YES   
Ethiopia  YES   
Finland   YES  
France   YES  
Gabon YES  Not yet in force 
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State African states Other states Not yet in force? 
 
Germany  YES  
Ghana  YES   
Greece   YES  
Grenada   YES  
Hungary   YES  
India   YES  
Indonesia  YES  
Iran   YES  
Ireland  YES  
Israel   YES  
Italy  YES  
Japan  YES  
Kenya YES  Not yet in force 
Korea (Republic of)  YES  
Kuwait   YES  
Lesotho YES   
Luxembourg  YES  
Malawi  YES   
Malaysia  YES  
Malta   YES  
Mauritius YES   
Mexico   YES  
Mozambique YES   
Namibia  YES   
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State African states Other states Not yet in force? 
Netherlands  YES  
New Zealand  YES  
Nigeria  YES   
Norway  YES  
Oman   YES  
Pakistan  YES  
Poland   YES  
Portugal  YES  
Romania  YES  
Russia   YES  
Rwanda  YES   
Saudi Arabia  YES  
Seychelles  YES   
Sierra Leone YES   
Singapore   YES  
Slovakia  YES  
Spain   YES  
Sudan YES  Not yet in force 
Swaziland  YES   
Sweden   YES  
Switzerland  YES  
Taiwan (Republic of 
China) 
 YES  
Tanzania YES   
Thailand   YES  
Tunisia  YES   
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State African states Other states Not yet in force? 
Turkey   YES  
Uganda YES   
Ukraine   YES  
United Kingdom   YES  
United States of 
America  
 YES  
Zambia  YES   
Zimbabwe  YES   
Total 24 53 4 
 
 
 (Source: SARS. 2013. Summary of all Treaties for the Avoidance of Double Taxation. Available: 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Agreements/LAPD-IntA-DTA-2013-01%20-
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Appendix C: Mauritius – double tax treaty network 
 
State African states Other states Not yet in force? 
Australia  YES  
Bangladesh  YES Not yet in force 
Barbados 
 
 YES  
Belgium 
 
 YES  
Botswana 
 
YES   
China (People’s 
Republic of) 
 YES  
Croatia 
 
 YES  
Cyprus 
 
 YES  
Egypt 
 
YES  Not yet in force 
France 
 
 YES  
Gabon 
 
YES  Not yet in force 
Germany 
 
 YES  
Guernsey 
 
 YES Not yet in force 
India 
 
 YES  
Italy 
 
 YES  
Kenya 
 
YES  Not yet in force 
Kuwait 
 
 YES  
Lesotho 
 
YES   
Luxembourg 
 
 YES  
Madagascar 
 
YES   
Malaysia 
 
 YES  
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State African states Other states Not yet in force? 
Monaco 
 
 YES  
Mozambique 
 
YES   
Namibia 
 
YES   
Nepal 
 
 YES  
Nigeria 
 
YES  Not yet in force 
Oman 
 
 YES  
Pakistan 
 
 YES  
Republic of Congo 
 
YES  Not yet in force 
Russia  YES Not yet in force 
Rwanda 
 
YES   
Senegal 
 
YES   
Seychelles 
 
YES   
Singapore 
 
 YES  
South Africa 
 
YES   
Sri Lanka  YES  
State of Qatar 
 
 YES  
Swaziland 
 
YES   
Sweden 
 
 YES  
Thailand 
 
 YES  
Tunisia 
 
YES   
Uganda 
 




 YES  
United Kingdom 
 
 YES  
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State African states Other states Not yet in force? 
Zambia 
 
YES   
Zimbabwe 
 
YES   
Total 19 27 8 
 
 (Source: IBFD Tax Research Platform – last accessed 20 January 2014) 
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Appendix D: Botswana – double tax treaty network 
 
State African states Other states Not yet in force? 
Barbados  YES  
France  YES  
India 
 
 YES  
Mauritius 
 
YES   
Russia  YES  
Seychelles 
 
YES   
South Africa 
 
YES   
Sweden 
 
 YES  
United Kingdom  YES  
Zambia YES  Not yet in force 
Zimbabwe YES  Not yet in force 
Total 5 6 2 
 




UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
An investigation into whether the South African and 
Mauritian preferential holding company regimes may 




Appendix E:  Cape Verde – double tax treaty 
network 
 
State African states Other states Not yet in force? 
Macau  YES  
Portugal  YES  
Total 
 
0 2 0 
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Appendix F: Republic of Congo – double tax treaty 
network 
 
State African states Other states Not yet in force? 
France  YES  
Italy  YES Not yet in force 
Mauritius YES  Not yet in force 
Tunisia YES  Not yet in force 
Total 
 
2 2 3 
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Appendix G: Seychelles – double tax treaty network 
 
State African states Other states Not yet in force? 
Bahrain  YES  
Barbados  YES  
Belgium  YES Not yet in force 
Botswana YES   
China (People’s 
Republic of) 
 YES  
Cyprus  YES  
Ethiopia YES  Not yet in force 
Indonesia  YES  
Isle of Man  YES  
Kuwait  YES Not yet in force 
Luxembourg  YES  
Malawi YES  Not yet in force 
Malaysia  YES  
Mauritius YES   
Monaco  YES  
Oman  YES  
San Marino  YES  
South Africa YES   
Sri Lanka  YES Not yet in force 
State of Qatar 
 
 YES  
Swaziland YES  Not yet in force 
 
Thailand  YES  
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State African states Other states Not yet in force? 
United Arab 
Emirates 
 YES  
Vietnam  YES  
Zambia YES   
Zimbabwe YES  Not yet in force 
Total 8 18 7 
 
 (Source: IBFD Tax Research Platform – last accessed 20 January 2014) 
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Appendix H: Tax information exchange agreements 
concluded by South Africa 
 
Jurisdiction Date signed Date entered force 
Argentina 
 
2 August 2013 
 
not yet in force 
 
The Bahamas 14 September 2011 25 May 2012 
Barbados 17 September 2013 not yet in force 
Bermuda 6 September 2011 8 February 2012 
Cayman Islands 10 May 2011 23 February 2012 
Cook Islands 25 October 2013 not yet in force 
Costa Rica 27 October 2012 not yet in force 
Dominica 7 February 2012 not yet in force 
Gibraltar 2 February 2012 21 July 2013 
Guernsey 21 February 2011 26 February 2012 
Jersey 12 July 2011 29 February 2012 
Liberia 7 February 2012 not yet in force 
Liechtenstein 6 December 2013 not yet in force 
Monaco 23 September 2013 not yet in force 
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Jurisdiction Date signed Date entered force 
Samoa 26 July 2012 not yet in force 
San Marino 10 March 2011 28 January 2012 
 
(Source:  Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 
Exchange of Tax Information Portal – Available: http://www.eoi-
portal.org/jurisdictions/ZA#agreements [14 January 2014]) 
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Appendix I: Tax information exchange agreements 





3. British Virgin Islands 
4. Brunei Darussalam 
5. Isle of Man 
6. Jamaica 
7. Lichtenstein 
8. Macao SAR 
9. Marshall Islands 
10. St. Kitts and Nevis 
11. Sint Maarten 
12. Turks and Caicos Islands  
13. Uruguay 
(Source: Summary of all Tax Information Exchange Agreements and Mutual Administrative 
Assistance Agreements  – Available: 
http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/LegalDoclib/Agreements/LAPD-IntA-EIA-2013-01%20-
%20Status%20Summary%20of%20all%20Tax%20Information%20Exchange%20Agreement
s.pdf [14 January 2014]) 
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Appendix J: Tax information exchange agreements 
concluded by Mauritius 
 
Jurisdiction Date signed Date entered force 
Australia 
 
8 December 2010 
 
1 January 2011 
 
Denmark 1 December 2011 1 June 2012 
Faroe Islands 1 December 2011 not yet in force 
Finland 1 December 2011 6 July 2012 
Greenland 1 December 2011 not yet in force 
Guernsey 6 February 2013 5 July 2013 
Iceland 1 December 2011 not yet in force 
Norway 1 December 2011 18 May 2012 
 
(Source:  Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 
Exchange of Tax Information Portal – Available: http://www.eoi-
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Appendix K: Tax information exchange and double 





2. Burkina Faso 
3. Canada 
4. Czech Republic 
5. Greece 
6. Hong Kong 
7. Lesotho 
8. Portugal 
9. Republic of Iran 
10. Malawi 
11. Saudi Arabia 






 (Source: MRA: Double Taxation Agreements  – Available: http:// 
http://mra.gov.mu/index.php/taxation/double-taxation-agreements [14 January 2014]) 
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